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ExEcutivE summary
•	The slackening of important economic reforms under 
president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao (2002-
2012), as well as the stimulus measures taken in response 
to the 2008 crisis to boost investments, have all led to 
a huge build-up of debt and created imbalances in the Chi-
nese economy, including in the financial markets and the 
industrial sector. As China’s original drivers of growth 
have been waning, stagnation of the reform process could 
lead to a serious economic crisis and, consequently, de-
prive the Chinese leadership of the main factor legitimis-
ing the Communist Party of China, i.e. the constantly im-
proving standards of living in China.
•	When the new generation of leaders came to power in Chi-
na, with Xi Jinping as president and Li Keqiang as the head 
of government, the Chinese leadership showed a strong 
ambition to overcome the status quo and resume reforms. 
A new draft reform agenda was presented in November 
2013 during the third plenum of the CPC Central Commit-
tee, one year after the party’s 18th congress. The key pledge 
that president Xi Jinping made at that time was to give 
market forces a ‘decisive role’ in the Chinese economy. The 
intention of the changes made ‘in the spirit of the third 
plenum’ was to break up the state monopolies, deregulate 
the real economy and the financial sector, restrict the role 
of state-owned enterprises (SOE), provide administrative 
support to private companies and open the Chinese econo-
my to foreign capital. The reforms were intended to create 
a new impulse for growth by resolving the fundamental 
problem of the Chinese economy, i.e. the faulty and politi-
cised resource allocation system.
•	In the past, the high level of state intervention in the 
economy allowed certain groups associated with the SOE 
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sector and the state-owned financial system, as well as 
the central and local-level bureaucracy, to reap extraor-
dinary profits from economic growth. The new leader-
ship regarded the vested interests which grew out of that 
situation as an influential political force interested in 
preserving the profitable status quo, and the main line of 
resistance to further reforms.
•	The move to centralise decision-making on economic re-
forms, one of president Xi Jinping’s key decisions taken 
after the third plenum, was guided by the logic of coun-
tering the vested interests resisting reforms. In Novem-
ber 2013, the so-called Central Leading Group for Compre-
hensively Deepening Reforms was created. It became the 
key element in the ‘transmission belt’ of the Chinese re-
form process, giving Xi direct control of the most impor-
tant changes and an instrument to overcome resistance 
within the bureaucracy. The anti-corruption campaign 
launched in 2013 was also an important tool for the im-
plementation of reforms. While it was intended to serve 
wider objectives, it became instrumental in consolidating 
power, rapidly replacing the bureaucratic cadres and dis-
ciplining the officials in charge of the economy at all levels 
of the state administration.
•	The new tools for implementing reform turned out to be 
marred by several defects, which contributed to further 
stagnation of reforms, while the concentration of deci-
sion-making powers in the hands of president Xi Jinping 
and his closest circle distorted the process of economic 
policy development. The government became margin-
alised and reduced to the role of an implementing body, 
which triggered a conflict over the division of competenc-
es between prime minister Li Keqiang and president Xi 
Jinping’s circle, while also diffusing the responsibility for 
detailed formulation and implementation of reforms. The 
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resulting vacuum allowed certain groups associated with 
the bureaucracy and interested in preserving the status 
quo to take over the initiative, of which the reform of 
state-owned enterprises is a case in point. The structure 
of the Central Leading Group has proven effective in ini-
tiating change but has not worked so well in sequencing 
actions and has created bottlenecks in the reform ‘trans-
mission belt’.
•	The changes initiated by Xi Jinping have reshaped the 
original relations between local governments in China 
and the central government in Beijing. However, despite 
partial centralisation, the success of reforms still de-
pends on the involvement of the local administrations, 
which are often interested in maintaining the status quo 
because of the still unresolved local government budget 
problems and the inconsistencies in Beijing’s actions and 
expectations. Another reason why the officials in charge 
of implementing reforms tend to be passive concerns their 
reluctance to take any risky decisions in the context of 
the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. 
•	The slowing down of China’s economic growth has forced 
the country’s top decision makers to modify their vision 
of economic reforms on many occasions. At critical mo-
ments, e.g. during the government interventions in Chi-
na’s exchange markets or the restructuring of the pro-
vincial government’s debt, Beijing has tended to opt for 
deep interventions in the economy, which run counter to 
the ‘spirit of the third plenum’ and exacerbate existing 
problems. While the Chinese leaders seem to agree that 
reforms need to continue, a dispute is mounting within 
the top ranks of leadership about whether it is still nec-
essary to employ stimulus measures while implementing 
the reforms. Continuing with the same stimulus methods 
as before, while reforms are stagnating, will exacerbate 
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the problems of the Chinese economy, contributing to its 
further destabilisation.
•	The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, sched-
uled for the autumn of 2017, will bring about a ‘new open-
ing’ in the key bodies of the CPC, which will probably 
allow Xi Jinping to fully consolidate his grip on economic 
policy. However, fixing the foundations of China’s econo-
my by resuming the agenda of the third plenum will re-
quire the CPC leaders to employ a considerable organisa-
tional and political resources, which will inevitably have 
to be diverted from other areas of governance. The fate of 
reforms will therefore depend on the individual calcula-
tions of Xi Jinping and his inner circle, who will have to 
weigh up the long-term benefits for the state and the party 
if China is put on a stable growth path against the short-
term gains from the resolution of emerging economic, so-
cial and political problems.
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introduction
Xi	Jinping	became	the	leader	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China	in	
2012	when	the	country	stood	at	a	particularly	difficult	 juncture	
of	 its	 ‘reform	and	opening-up’	 policy	path,	 on	which	China	had	
embarked	 30	years	 before.	The	 country	had	 to	 face	 the	deepest	
revision	to	its	economic	development	model	in	decades,	while	at	
the	same	time	dealing	with	the	serious	consequences	of	foregoing	
reforms	in	the	previous	decade	and	the	problems	generated	by	the	
huge	economic	stimulus	operation	undertaken	after	the	2009	cri-
sis.	Responding	to	those	challenges,	the	new	Chinese	leadership	
with	Xi	Jinping	at	the	helm	decided	to	re-define	the	role	of	the	state	
in	the	economy,	resume	the	reforms	and	revise	the	institutional	
architecture	supporting	their	implementation.	The	purpose	of	the	
present	paper	is	to	assess	Xi	Jinping’s	first	term,	in	order	to	ascer-
tain	how	effective	the	new	mechanisms	for	reform	implementa-
tion	have	been	and	to	what	extent	they	have	addressed	the	major	
problems	faced	by	the	Chinese	economy.	The	analysis	is	based	on	
Chinese	 and	 foreign	 sources,	 including	 statements	 by	 Chinese	
state	representatives	and	official	documents,	articles	in	the	busi-
ness	press,	China’s	statistical	figures	and	their	analyses,	as	well	as	
detailed	studies	by	foreign	research	institutions.
Part	1	discusses	the	main	economic	problems	engendered	by	the	
imbalanced	economic	stimulus	model	developed	in	China	in	the	
previous	decade	and	applied	most	intensively	during	the	2009	cri-
sis.	Part	2	outlines	 the	main	objectives	of	 the	new	economic	re-
form	agenda	put	forward	by	the	Xi-Li	team	and	assesses	the	pro-
gress	of	selected	reform	projects	which	are	of	crucial	importance	
for	restoring	balance	in	the	Chinese	economy.	Due	to	limitations	
of	space,	the	paper	does	not	look	into	the	reforms	which	concern	
the	 international	aspect	of	China’s	economic	development,	 such	
as	the	internationalisation	of	the	Chinese	currency	or	liberalisa-
tion	of	capital	flows.	Part	3	deals	with	the	new	institutional	archi-
tecture	created	by	Xi	Jinping	in	order	to	gain	control	of	the	speed	
and	scope	of	economic	reforms.	Finally,	Part	4	points	to	the	causes	
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of	the	effective	stalling	of	key	reforms,	which	are	related	to	the	
defects	 of	 the	 newly	 developed	 reform	 implementation	mecha-
nisms	and	the	negative	impact	of	the	economic	slowdown.
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i. starting point for furthEr rEform
The	 economic	 policy	 objectives	 and	 agenda	 of	 the	 new	 Chinese	
leadership	with	Xi	Jinping	at	the	helm	had	to	be	focused,	at	least	
in	the	early	period,	on	resolving	the	existing	problems	inherited	
from	 predecessors.	The	 strong	 emphasis	 on	what	 had	 been	 ne-
glected	 by	 the	 previous	 leaders,	 which	was	 notable	 during	 the	
handover	of	power	in	2012,	as	well	as	the	new	leaders’	pledges	to	
‘resume’	economic	reform,	were	a	response	to	the	commonly	held	
conviction	within	the	top	ranks	of	the	CPC	that	reforms	had	in-
deed	stagnated	during	the	Hu	Jintao	and	Wen	Jiabao	years,	which	
some	of	their	most	vociferous	critics	dubbed	the	‘lost	decade’.
1. The ‘lost decade’ of Hu and Wen
The	courageous	reforms	implemented	under	Jiang	Zemin	and	Zhu	
Rongji	in	the	late	1990s,	when	China	joined	the	WTO	and	partly	pri-
vatised	its	public	sector,	gave	a	strong	pro-growth	impulse	to	the	
Chinese	economy	in	the	first	decade	of	the	20th	century.	However,	
the	strong	economic	growth	which	China	enjoyed,	thanks	to	access	
to	global	markets	and	its	rising	industrial	efficiency,	 lowered	the	
Chinese	leadership’s	appetite	for	continuing	difficult	structural	re-
forms.	At	the	same	time,	various	acute	social	problems,	which	had	
been	gradually	mounting	 since	 the	beginning	of	 the	 ‘reform	and	
opening-up’	period,	became	evident	in	the	form	of	rapidly	deepen-
ing	 inequalities	 between	 different	 social	 strata	 and	 different	 re-
gions	of	the	country.	Because	of	the	potential	threat	that	this	situ-
ation	posed	to	 the	stability	of	government,	 the	Communist	Party	
of	China	decided	to	abandon	Deng	Xiaoping’s	doctrine	of	xianfu lun	
(letting	some	get	rich	first).	The	Hu-Wen	team	decided	to	focus	on	
levelling	out	the	inequalities	and	building	a	‘harmonious	society’.	
This	 entailed	 adopting	 a	 more	 moderate	 course	 of	 economic	 re-
forms	and	partly	changing	the	priorities	of	China’s	transformation.
As the key reforms had come to a halt, the spectacular ex-
pansion of China’s economy in the first years of the 21st 
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century occurred in a strongly regulated business en-
vironment in which market mechanisms remained re-
strained and were still subordinated to the state’s develop-
ment goals.	Even	though	the	prices	of	nearly	all	commodities	
had	 been	 liberalised,	 the	 planning	 institutions	 continued	 to	
control	the	prices	of	the	basic	means	of	production	crucial	for	
the	economy,	such	as	energy	and	raw	materials,	as	well	as	in-
terest	 rates	 on	 deposits.	 The	 state	 also	 indirectly	 influenced	
the	 prices	 of	 land	 (which	 legally	 remains	 state-owned)	 and	
labour	(by	controlling	migration	through	the	hukou	residency	
registration	system).	Money	supply	remained	 in	 the	hands	of	
the	nearly	completely	 state-dominated	banking	sector,	which	
was	regulated	more	 tightly	 than	 in	other	economies.	The	key	
economic	sectors,	 including	energy,	banking	and	 telecommu-
nications,	 also	 remained	 strongly	 regulated	 and	monopolised	
by	state-owned	companies,	which	additionally	benefited	from	
subsidies	and	bankruptcy	protection	measures.	
In a decision of fundamental importance for China’s future 
economic development, the Hu-Wen team assigned an im-
portant role in stimulating economic growth to the public 
sector.	Even	though	some	enterprises	had	been	deeply	restruc-
tured	 or	 liquidated	 in	 the	 late	 1990s,	 China	 still	 had	 around	
150,000	 companies	 controlled	 by	 the	 central	 government	 and	
local	governments.	Nominally	operating	on	market	principles,	
those	companies	often	served	as	a	tool	to	stimulate	GDP	growth	
–	an	alternative	to	increased	budget	spending	–	with	the	central	
government’s	approval.	For	the	Chinese	bureaucracy,	especially	
at	the	local	level,	economic	success	is	closely	linked	to	advance-
ment	within	the	structures	of	the	CPC,	which	introduced	an	im-
portant	political	element	into	the	economic	calculations	of	state-
owned	companies.	The	effects	of	the	Hu-Wen	team’s	strategy	on	
state-owned	 companies	 first	 became	 visible	 shortly	 after	 the	
2002	plenum.	While	in	2001,	investments	in	the	Chinese	econ-
omy	had	increased	by	13%	year	on	year,	in	2003	the	figure	was	
already	26%,	with	state-owned	companies	accounting	for	three	
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quarters	 of	 the	 growth.1	 China	 reported	 investment	 growth	
rates	exceeding	25%	a	year,	i.e.	more	than	twice	as	high	as	over-
all	GDP	growth,	for	the	next	9	years	of	the	Hu-Wen	term.2	
With	an	economic	system	based	on	extensive	state	intervention,	
the	 Chinese	 government	 had	 all	 the	 instruments	 it	 needed	 to	
continue	applying	its	model	of	state-controlled	economic	growth	
based	on	multi-level	planning.	However,	as	the	Chinese	economy	
expanded,	 became	more	 complex	 and	more	 open	 to	 foreign	 ac-
tors,	the	government	was	less	and	less	able	to	strictly	and	effec-
tively	control	it,	with	potentially	amplified	consequences	arising	
from	any	misguided	regulations.	Meanwhile,	the	bureaucracy	re-
mained	very	influential,	often	guided	by	its	own	particular	inter-
ests	that	were	not	necessarily	aligned	with	sustainable	economic	
development	 objectives.	The resulting market signal distor-
tions engendered the fundamental weakness of the Chinese 
economic system, i.e. the systemic misallocation of econom-
ic resources. The problem surfaced most visibly during the 
2008 crisis when the Chinese leadership launched its massive 
stimulus operation.
2. The 2008 crisis: stimulus and destabilisation
The	Chinese	government’s	response	to	the	global	economic	crisis	
of	2008	was	fully	in	line	with	the	logic	of	the	Hu-Wen	team’s	eco-
nomic	policy	formulated	in	the	preceding	years.	While	the	crisis	
did	not	directly	affect	China	because	of	 the	country’s	 insulated	
1	 Dan	Blumenthal	 i	Derek	Scissors,	China’s	Great	Stagnation,	The	National	
Interest,	17.10.2016,	http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-great-stag-
nation-18073?page=show	
2	 The	share	of	private	companies	in	total	investments	was	growing	systemati-
cally	in	the	period	in	question	but	it	exceeded	50%	only	in	2015,	while	the	
state-owned	sector	continued	to	play	the	key	role	in	this	respect.	See:	Nicho-
las	Lardy	and	Zixuan	Huang,	China	Private	Investment	Softens,	But	Not	as	
Much	as	Official	Data	Suggest,	PIIE,	19.04.2016,	https://piie.com/blogs/china-
economic-watch/china-private-investment-softens-not-much-official-data-
suggest	
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financial	system,	it	had	an	adverse	impact	on	the	global	market	
situation,	undermining	the	demand	for	Chinese	exports.	 In	or-
der	to	avert	destabilisation,	 the	Chinese	government	developed	
a	 two-year	 stimulus	 programme	 which	 was	 launched	 in	 late	
2008	and	early	2009	with	a	budget	of	more	than	CNY	4	trillion	
(around	US$	590	billion)	of	public	money,	which	corresponded	to	
nearly	12%	of	China’s	GDP.	Most	of	the	funds	were	channelled	into	
infrastructure	development	 including	roads,	railways,	airports	
and	energy	infrastructure.	The	second	most	important	category	
of	spending	comprised	investments	in	improving	the	standards	
of	living,	including	housing,	environmental	protection	and	rural	
development.3	
An important element in the implementation of the stimu-
lus concerned delegating responsibilities to local levels of 
governments, i.e. provincial, county and city governments.	
Hoping	to	benefit	from	the	huge	investment	funds	and	lucrative	
contracts	 for	 local	 political-business	 groups,	 the	 local	 adminis-
trations	responded	enthusiastically	 to	 the	announcement	of	 the	
stimulus	 package:	 within	 a	 short	 period	 after	 the	 programme	
was	 announced,	 the	Central	National	Development	 and	Reform	
Commission	 received	 project	 applications	worth	 a	 total	 of	 CNY	
18	trillion.4	This	massive	collective	undertaking,	however,	stum-
bled	on	the	absence	of	adequate	sources	of	financing.	The	central	
government	had	committed	only	CNY	1.18	trillion,	 i.e.	 less	 than	
30%5	of	 the	total	stimulus	package	amount,	while	 the	 local	gov-
ernments	 were	 expected	 to	 shoulder	 the	 remaining	 costs.	 Yet	
their	ability	to	increase	spending	by	running	wider	deficits	was	
3	 NDRC	Details	Four	Trillion	Stimulus	Package,	Caijing	Online,	01.12.2008,	
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-12-01/110033094.html	
4	 地方政府出台18万亿投资计划 资金来源引关注,	25.11.2008,	Xinhua,	http://news.
xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-11/25/content_10407671.htm	
5	 Zheng	Yongnian	and	Chen	Minjia,	How	effective	will	China’s	four	trillion	
yuan	 stimulus	 plan	 be?,	Briefing series,	 issue	 49,	 China	 Policy	 Institute,	
03.2009,	 http://nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-
49-how-efficient-4-tln-yuan.pdf	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
17
15
legally	limited	as	they	could	not,	for	instance,	issue	bonds	without	
the	central	 government’s	 consent.	Because	of	 those	 constraints,	
much	of	the	stimulus	was	implemented	using	instruments	other	
than	budget	spending,	i.e.	through	investments	by	the	SOE	sector,	
a	majority	of	which	are	controlled	by	local	governments,	as	well	
as	the	so-called	Local	Government	Financing	Vehicles	(LGFV)	for	
infrastructure	 development.	Through	 these,	 local	 governments	
could	borrow	money	from	the	financial	markets,	both	from	state-
owned	banks	and	from	the	rapidly	growing	shadow	banking	sec-
tor,	which	offered	high-interest	loans	and	was	not	subject	to	the	
regulations	applicable	to	official	financial	institutions.
Chart 1. Investment growth in China, % year-on-year, 2006-2016
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source: Peterson Institute for International Economics
In	parallel	with	the	budget	spending	stimulus,	 in	2009	the	Chi-
nese	central	bank	launched	a	quantitative	easing	operation	which	
involved	a	series	of	interest	rate	reductions	and	decisions	to	low-
er	mandatory	reserve	levels	for	banks	and	supplied	the	Chinese	
economy	with	a	huge	volume	of	cheap	capital.	In	2009	China	re-
ported	an	unprecedented	 increase	 in	 the	 supply	of	 loans:	at	 the	
end	of	the	year	the	total	value	of	loans	in	the	portfolios	of	China’s	
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financial	 institutions	 was	 close	 to	 CNY	 40	 trillion,	 i.e.	 had	 in-
creased	by	as	much	as	32%	over	 the	previous	year.6	Responding	
to	 the	 first	 negative	 effects	 of	 flooding	 the	markets	 with	 extra	
capital	(such	as	the	marked	growth	of	housing	prices	in	late	2009	
and	 early	 2010),	 the	 central	 government	 introduced	 a	 series	 of	
regulations	 to	 limit	money	supply.	Credit	 limits	 for	banks	were	
tightened	and	regulations	were	adopted	to	constrain	the	inflating	
speculative	bubble	in	the	housing	market.	
Chart 2. Increase in the volume of CNY-denominated loans out-
standing, % year-on-year, 1998-2016 
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source: tradingeconomics.com, People’s Bank of China
This tighter monetary policy created an enormous pressure 
on those entities which had borrowed money to start large-
scale investments that were not always economically viable 
and often politically-motivated.	 The	 long-term	 infrastruc-
tural	projects	implemented	by	the	LGFV,	the	housing	sector	sud-
denly	cut	off	from	capital	supply,	and	the	SOEs	expanding	their	
6	 China	reports	record	9.59	trln	yuan	in	loans	in	2009,	Xinhua,	15.01.2010,	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/15/content_12816059.htm	
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production	capacity,	all	needed	additional	financing.	As	the	sup-
ply	of	loans	from	state-owned	banks	shrank,	they	turned	to	the	
so-called	shadow	banking	sector,7	with	the	official	banks	acting	
as	 intermediaries	 and	 benefitting	 financially	 without	 burden-
ing	 their	 balance	 sheets.	While	 the	 shadow	banking	 sector	had	
been	growing	in	China	since	2001,	when	this	kind	of	operations	
were	first	authorised,	the	2009	stimulus	plan	turned	out	to	be	the	
real	catalyst	of	its	development.	The	sector’s	opaqueness	makes	it	
difficult	 to	assess	 its	size	but	according	to	various	estimates	the	
shadow	banking	sector	expanded	ten-fold	in	the	years	2008-2013,	
from	CNY	4.5	trillion	to	around	CNY	20-46	trillion	(correspond-
ing	to	35-81%	of	China’s	2013	GDP).8
3. China’s economy on a downward slope
The	stimulus	model	formulated	and	implemented	during	the	term	
of	Hu	and	Wen	turned	out	to	have	many	potentially	destructive	
effects	on	the	Chinese	economy.	It	engendered	complex	problems	
in	 the	 real	 economy,	 the	 financial	 system	 and	 public	 finance.	
Resolving	them	became	the	principal	challenge	for	president	Xi	
Jinping’s	team	which	came	to	power	in	2012.	However, the orig-
inal stimulus model had already brought about certain con-
sequences which constitute a fundamental limitation on the 
new Chinese leadership’s economic policy. Until	new	ways	 to	
promote	growth	are	developed	–	which	will	require	deep	struc-
tural	reforms	–	any	further	stimulus	action	using	the	old	methods	
will	only	deepen	the	existing	imbalances,	augmenting	the	risk	of	
a	major	economic	crisis.
7	 The	system	of	finance	companies	playing	a	role	similar	to	that	of	banks,	which	
are	not	covered	by	the	official	regulations	and	not	part	of	the	banking	safe-
guard	arrangements.	
8	 Douglas	Eliott	et al.,	Shadow	Banking	in	China:	A	Primer,	Economic Stud-
ies at Brookings, Brookings	Institute,	2015,	https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/shadow_banking_china_elliott_kroeber_yu.pdf	
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The massive corporate debt pile is the principal challenge 
faced by the Chinese economy. Even	 though	 the	 increase	 in	
the	volume	of	credit	was	slower	 in	 the	years	 that	 followed	 the	
record-breaking	2009	and	oscillated	around	15%	a	year,	 in	 the	
context	of	dwindling	GDP	growth	the	credit	supply	turned	out	to	
be	growing	several	times	faster	than	the	economy.	According	to	
some	estimates,	China’s	debt	increased	from	around	160%	of	GDP	
in	 2005	 to	 247%	 of	 GDP	 in	 2015,	with	 corporate	 debt	 account-
ing	for	two	thirds	of	that	figure.9	On	top	of	that,	the	the	degree	
of	 credit	 creation	 needed	 to	 stimulate	 a	 given	 amount	 of	 GDP	
growth	has	been	gradually	rising:	while	in	the	years	2003-2008	
it	took	1	CNY	of	new	financing	to	generate	1	CNY	of	GDP,	in	2015	
it	was	already	as	high	as	4	CNY,	and	just	one	year	later	–	6	CNY.10	
Thus,	the	Chinese	economy	has	found	itself	in	a	situation	where	
mounting	 debt	 generates	 increasingly	 subpar	 growth.	 Mean-
while,	 the	 fate	of	 the	 sectors	which	embarked	upon	expensive	
long-term	investments	in	the	period	of	weaker	growth	depends	
on	 their	 ability	 to	 continue	 borrowing	money.	The	debt	 pile	 is	
currently	considered	to	pose	the	greatest	threat	to	China’s	eco-
nomic	future,	and	a	heated	debate	on	the	potentially	imminent	
debt	crisis	is	unfolding.	The	issue	is	in	the	focus	of	major	inter-
national	financial	institutions	and	a	growing	number	of	foreign	
observers,	many	of	whom	are	starting	to	believe	that	China	will	
not	be	able	to	get	out	of	the	debt	spiral.11	
9	 The	figure	also	includes	sovereign	debt,	the	banking	sector’s	debt	and	house-
holds’	debt.	See:	Digging	Into	China’s	Growing	Mountain	of	Debt,	Bloomberg,	
28.08.2016,	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-28/digging-
into-china-s-growing-mountain-of-debt	
10	 Calculations	by	Morgan	Stanley,	quoted	in:	China's	growth	sucks	in	more	
debt	bucks	for	less	Bang,	Reuters,	23.06.2016,	http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/china-economy-debt-idUSL4N1A908F	
11	 Views	about	the	possible	form	that	the	crisis	in	China	will	take	vary	widely	–	
from	the	‘Japanese’	scenario	of	long-term	economic	stagnation	to	more	apoca-
lyptic	visions	involving	a	disintegration	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China.	
See:	Michael	Pettis,	 If	we	don’t	understand	both	sides	of	China’s	balance	
sheet,	we	understand	neither,	09.2015,	http://blog.mpettis.com/2015/09/if-
we-dont-understand-both-sides-of-chinas-balance-sheet-we-understand-
neither/	
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China’s financial system has been growing bigger, less trans-
parent and more interdependent.	The	share	of	bad	debts	in	the	
portfolios	of	Chinese	banks	has	also	been	growing.	While	the	sta-
bility	of	the	largest	state-owned	banks	is	not	at	risk	thanks	to	the	
relatively	strong	regulations	in	place,	the	growing	pressure	of	bad	
debts	and	the	fact	that	banks	are	often	forced	to	intervene	in	the	
ailing	sectors	of	the	economy	make	further	liberalisation	and	re-
form	of	the	banking	system	difficult.	As	the	capital	markets	re-
main	underdeveloped,	the	massive	volume	of	capital	circulating	
in	China’s	financial	system	has	been	struggling	to	find	adequate	
rates	of	return	and	has	often	ended	up	in	the	shadow	banking	sys-
tem,	making	the	whole	financial	sector	even	less	transparent	and	
the	size	of	the	economy	more	difficult	to	estimate.	Large	streams	
of	money	have	also	been	flowing	into	the	housing	market	and	the	
corporate	 stock	 and	bond	markets,	 generating	 speculative	 bub-
bles	that	pose	a	serious	problem	for	the	government.
The investment stimulus has led to overproduction in the 
housing sector and a substantial increase in the number of 
uninhabited new dwellings.	 In	 the	 course	of	 the	main	 stimu-
lus	operation	 in	2009	and	the	 further	stimulus	measures	 taken	
via	the	LGFVs,	investments	(in	the	public	sector	as	well	as	in	the	
private	 sector,	 which	 has	 responded	 strongly	 to	 the	 construc-
tion	boom)	have	 focused	mainly	 in	 sectors	offering	rapid	 short-
term	growth.	The	massive	infrastructural	investments	and	rapid	
growth	in	the	construction	sector	have	generated	extraordinary	
demand	for	the	products	of	heavy	industry,	such	as	cement,	steel	
and	coal,	and	indirectly	also	electricity.	In	many	instances,	local	
authorities	viewed	the	mere	extension	of	a	coal	mine,	steelworks	
or	 power	 plant	 as	 a	way	 to	 stimulate	 the	 economy	 and	 achieve	
higher	local	GDP	growth	–	an	important	factor	in	nominations	to	
higher	party	positions.	This	has	led	to	substantial	overproduction	
in	some	sectors	such	as	steelmaking	and	coal	extraction.12
12	 In	2015,	China’s	coal	extraction	capacity	was	estimated	at	5.7	billion	tonnes	
a	year,	of	which	only	around	3.9	was	used	while	new	facilities	with	extrac-
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Using the SOE sector as a means of stimulating the econo-
my has considerably suppressed its profitability, which de-
creased from 5% in 2007 to around 2.2% in 2015.13 Importantly,	
state-owned	companies	are	usually	protected	against	bankruptcy	
through	direct	 interventions	or	arrangements	allowing	them	to	
roll	 their	 debt	 indefinitely,	 for	 political	 and	 image-related	 rea-
sons.	They	also	benefit	from	informal	links	to	the	CPC	structures	
and	more	favourable	investment	risk	ratings	based	on	the	expec-
tation	 that	 the	 state	will	provide	financial	assistance	 if	needed,	
while	bankers	 face	 lower	penalties	 for	 failed	 investments	 if	 the	
case	at	hand	is	a	state-owned	company.	The	political	decision	not	
to	allow	state-owned	companies	to	fail	and	to	grant	them	privi-
leged	access	to	capital	has	led	to	the	emergence	of	a	sizeable	group	
of	so-called	zombie companies	which	support	themselves	solely	by	
taking	on	more	debt.	
Channelling massive funds to investments and the privi-
leged treatment of state-owned capital have engendered the 
phenomenon of guojin mintui (‘the state advances, the private 
sector retreats’) in China.	The	weaker	 competitive	position	 of	
private	enterprises,	 and	especially	 the	 small	 and	medium-sized	
companies,	which	are	important	drivers	of	innovation,	as	well	as	
the	tougher	conditions	for	doing	business	which	private	compa-
nies	face,	have	become	one	of	the	main	barriers	for	development	
in	China.	This	situation	has	many	negative	consequences.	Entre-
preneurs	running	private	businesses	who	need,	 for	 instance,	 to	
tion	capacity	of	1.4	billion	tonnes	were	under	construction	(of	which	around	
0.8	billion	of	new	capacity	was	being	built	 illegally).	Steel	production	 in	
the	same	year	was	estimated	at	around	0.8	billion	tonnes,	with	total	capac-
ity	of	around	1.2	billion	tonnes.	See:	Lu	Zhiyao,	State	of	Play	in	the	Chinese	
Steel	 Industry,	 PIIE,	 5.06.2016,	 https://piie.com/blogs/china-economic-
watch/state-play-chinese-steel-industry,	我国煤炭行业产能家底基本摸清, 
Jingji	 Ribao,	 12.01.2016,	 http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201601/12/
t20160112_8203711.shtml
13	 Return-on-assets (ROA). See:	Andrew	Batson,	Villains	or	Victims?	The	role	
of	SOEs	in	China’s	Economy,	China Economic Quarterly, Vol.	20,	No.	2,	2016,	
http://research.gavekal.com/sites/default/files/CEQ%20Q2%202016.pdf
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obtain	a	loan	from	a	state-owned	bank,	increasingly	have	to	rely	
on	personal	contacts	with	the	administration,	as	a	result	of	which	
many	SMEs	turn	to	the	shadow	banking	sector.	There	have	been	
many	cases	of	state-owned	enterprises	taking	over	their	private	
competitors,	e.g.	in	the	steelmaking	sector.	Finally,	access	to	cheap	
capital	has	encouraged	many	managers	in	state-owned	enterpris-
es	to	enter	completely	new	markets,	e.g.	the	lucrative	real	estate	
market	into	which	many	government-controlled	companies	with	
no	previous	links	to	the	sector	have	expanded	since	2009.14	
Sustaining the current stimulus model should be treated as 
a factor that will delay the thorough restructuring of China’s 
economy.	There	is	consensus	among	the	Chines	elites	on	the	need	
to	fundamentally	transform	the	structure	of	the	Chinese	economy	
and	find	new	drivers	of	growth	capable	of	replacing	the	old	model,	
based	on	cheap	labour	and	favourable	demographics,	which	has	
all	but	exhausted	 its	potential.	 In	keeping	with	 the	experiences	
of	other	East	Asian	nations,	the	solution	envisaged	is	to	restruc-
ture	industry	by	developing	high	technology	and	innovative	sec-
tors	and	to	expand	the	role	of	the	services	sector.	Growth	is	to	be	
driven	by	domestic	consumption	by	the	several	hundred	million-
strong	middle	 class,	 instead	 of	 unsustainable	 investments.	The	
stimulus	model	employed	in	the	previous	decade	has	been	shown	
to	trap	capital	in	sectors	with	relatively	lower	efficiency	and	nar-
row	added	value	(steelmaking,	the	cement	sector,	the	extractive	
sector)	 and	 exacerbate	 the	 systemic	 risks	 in	 China’s	 financial	
sector.	While	some	kinds	of	investments,	e.g.	infrastructural	in-
vestments,	are	conducive	to	a	change	of	the	economic	model,	the	
negative	consequences	of	their	excessive	scale	and	unsustainable	
financing	models	clearly	outweigh	the	benefits.
14	 China	Fortifies	State	Businesses	to	Fuel	Growth,	New York Times,	30.08.2010,	
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html?hp
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ii. rEconstruction in thE ‘spirit of thE 
third plEnum’
1.  A new impulse for change…
In	 late	 2013,	 having	 preliminarily	 consolidated	 its	 power	 after	
one	year	in	office,	the	new	Chinese	leadership	presented	an	ambi-
tious	economic	reform	agenda	which	directly	addressed	China’s	
mounting	 problems.	Xi Jinping personally took over respon-
sibility for drafting the official reform programme, thus en-
croaching on the economic policy competences traditionally 
vested in the prime minister.	During	 the	 third	plenum	of	 the	
18th	National	Congress	of	the	CPC,	the	Plan	for	Comprehensively	
Deepening	Reforms	(quanmian shenhua gaige)	was	presented	–	 it	
was	an	orientation	document	to	guide	reforms	in	the	fifteen	areas	
of	crucial	importance	for	China’s	further	development.15	From	the	
point	of	view	of	the	country’s	mounting	economic	problems,	the	
most	important	provisions	in	the	document	concerned	the	pledg-
es	to	deeply	reform	the	economy	along	market	principles,	resume	
the	reform	of	 state-owned	enterprises	and	change	 the	relations	
between	the	central	government	and	the	local	governments.	
The central point of the new economic reform agenda was the 
pledge to change the role of the state in the economy and grant 
market forces ‘a decisive role’ – it was formulated to address 
the fundamental problem of misallocation of resources in 
China’s economy.	The	intention	behind	the	reformers’	decision	to	
increase	the	role	of	the	market	was	to	improve	the	economy’s	ef-
ficiency	and	generate	a	new	pro-growth	impulse.	Also	important	
from	this	point	of	view	was	the	pledge	to	streamline	the	allocation	
of	 capital	 by	developing	 state-of-the-art	 capital	markets	 and	al-
lowing	the	private	sector	to	open	small	and	medium-sized	banks.	
15	 Decision	of	 the	Central	Committee	of	 the	Communist	Party	of	China	on	
Some	Major	 Issues	Concerning	Comprehensively	Deepening	 the	Reform	
(Beijing:	 CC	 CPC),	 http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_ses-
sion/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm
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A	plan	was	also	presented	to	open	the	economy	to	foreign	inves-
tors	and	to	introduce	a	system	for	free	convertibility	of	the	Chi-
nese	currency.	It	was	announced	that	markets	would	be	opened	to	
private	companies,	apart	from	those	sectors	reserved	for	the	state,	
that	the	regulation	of	prices	of	key	means	of	production	would	be	
abolished,	 that	 monopolistic	 practices	 and	 unfair	 competition	
would	be	combated,	and	that	formal	barriers	to	engaging	in	busi-
ness	activity	would	be	removed.	
Prominent in the new reform agenda were projects to im-
prove the state of local budgets while strengthening central 
government oversight.	 The	 plans	 to	 fix	 local	 government	 fi-
nance,	control	its	mounting	debt	and	implement	tax	reform	should	
be	seen	as	an	effort	to	eliminate	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	debt,	
i.e.	the	activities	of	local	government	officials	seeking	to	stimulate	
local	economic	growth	in	order	to	gain	political	or	financial	bene-
fits	or	improve	the	financial	situation	of	the	local	administration.	
A	need	was	identified	to	create	a	standardised,	transparent	budg-
etary	system	for	local	governments	(with	an	extensive	reporting	
system)	 and	 to	 improve	 the	methods	 of	 debt	management.	The	
reformers	promised	to	introduce	new	taxes,	including	personal,	
real	estate	or	environmental	taxes,	to	improve	the	condition	of	lo-
cal	budgets	and	indirectly	curb	the	wasteful	use	of	resources	in	
the	industrial	sector	and	the	uncontrolled	price	increases	in	the	
housing	sector.	Finally,	 it	was	also	announced	that	some	spend-
ing	categories	would	be	taken	over	by	higher	levels	of	government	
(i.e.	 provincial	 government	 and	 central	 government),	 and	 that	
transfers	from	central	government	would	increase.	
One of the most important pledges in the new reform agenda 
concerned a limited reform of the state-owned enterprise 
sector, which had enjoyed privileged access to resources de-
spite its relatively lower efficiency.	The	main	aim	of	the	reform	
was	defined	as	improving	the	efficiency	of	the	state-owned	sector	
by	stepping	up	oversight	over	its	activities	and	making	them	more	
transparent.	This	was	to	be	done	by	increasing	the	involvement	
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of	 private	 capital	 in	 state-owned	 companies	 (through	 the	 so-
called	mixed-ownership	reform)	while	at	the	same	time	altering	
the	rules	on	SOE	management.	The	reform	envisaged	that	state-
owned	business	assets	would	no	longer	be	managed	by	a	delegated	
supervisory	 institution,	 but	 instead	 –	 by	 specially	 established	
funds	 tasked	with	multiplying	 state-owned	 capital.	 Concerning	
the	conditions	for	doing	business,	SEOs	were	to	be	put	on	the	same	
footing	as	other	economic	actors.	Importantly,	even	though	the	in-
tention	of	the	proposed	reform	was	to	open	the	state-owned	sec-
tor	to	market	forces	and	increase	competition,	official	documents	
still	directly	stated	that	SOEs	would	continue	to	play	a	dominant	
role	 in	 the	economy	and	continue	 to	 serve	as	an	economic	poli-
cy	 instrument.16	This	 language	revealed	one	of	 the	most	 signifi-
cant	limitations	of	the	reform	‘spirit’,	showing	that	the	proposed	
changes	would	be	evolutionary	in	nature	and	that	the	new	lead-
ers	were	averse	to	radical	economic	solutions	such	as	large-scale	
privatisation.	
2. ... and the drifting of key reforms
The capital markets, which were expected to improve the fi-
nancial situation of SOEs and offer better access to capital to 
the most efficient sectors of the economy, did undergo some 
degree of liberalisation. However, responding to a series of 
shocks in Chinese markets, the government moved to im-
plement a series of measures which strengthened the state’s 
control of the economy, quite against the ‘spirit of the third 
plenum’. The	deepest	 regression	 occurred	 in	 the	 Chinese	 stock	
markets	which,	after	 the	 initial	 liberalisation	 (e.g.	of	 IPO	rules)	
were	again	brought	under	strict	control	in	2015,	with	temporary	
suspensions	of	trading,	a	halt	on	new	IPOs	and	a	prohibition	for	
investors	from	selling	stock.	According	to	various	estimates,	in-
terventions	to	save	the	stock	market	could	have	cost	as	much	as	
US$	234	billion,	with	most	of	the	money	coming	from	state-owned	
16	 Ibidem.
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financial	 institutions,	which	 further	 increased	 the	 pressure	 on	
the	banking	 sector.17	 In	 the	years	2015-2016	 some	changes	were	
implemented	in	the	bonds	market,	e.g.	a	greater	number	of	com-
panies	were	allowed	to	issue	bonds	and	wider	access	to	the	mar-
ket	was	granted	to	individual	investors.18	However,	the	dynamics	
of	this	market’s	growth	is	strongly	linked	with	the	prospects	for	
its	internationalisation	(admission	of	foreign	institutional	inves-
tors),	and	thus	depends	on	the	progress	of	liberalisation	of	China’s	
capital	 account	 –	 and	 here	 the	 Chinese	 leaders	 are	 acting	 cau-
tiously	because	of	the	risk	of	sudden	capital	outflows.
Relatively large progress has been made in reforming Chi-
na’s banking system, which is of crucial importance from 
the point of view of improving the allocation of capital in 
the economy and increasing Chinese consumers’ purchasing 
power. However, the banking sector’s condition worsened 
again after the banks were engaged in some ad hoc interven-
tions to prop up the economy. The	years	2014-2015	were	marked	
by	significant	changes	in	the	banking	sector:	interest	rates	were	
gradually	liberalised	(e.g.	the	upper	limit	on	banking	account	in-
terest	rates	was	abolished),	a	deposit	insurance	scheme	was	cre-
ated,	 and	 licences	were	 granted	 to	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 private	
banks.	This	 contributed	 to	 increasing	 competition	 in	 the	 sector	
and	a	strengthening	of	the	position	of	smaller	banks.	However,	the	
state-owned	 sector	 remains	 dominant,	 with	 smaller	 provincial	
and	city	banks	gaining	importance,	which	increases	the	exposure	
to	 risks	 associated	with	 the	 shadow	 banking	 sector.	Moreover,	
the	problem	of	the	state-owned	enterprises’	privileged	access	to	
capital	remains	unresolved,	with	state-owned	businesses	paying	
17	 China’s	‘national	team’	owns	6%	of	stock	market,	Financial Times,	26.11.2015,	
https://www.ft.com/content/7515f06c-939d-11e5-9e3e-eb48769cecab	
18	 With	the	progressing	liberalisation,	the	bond	market	has	been	increasingly	
unstable,	prompting	state	interventions	such	as	the	suspension	of	trading	in	
futures	in	December	2016.	See:	Why	buying	China	bonds	and	stocks	is	look-
ing	dicey,	CNBC,	16.12.2016,	http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/16/why-buying-
china-bonds-and-stocks-is-looking-dicey.html	
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interest	on	their	loans	at	rates	0.5	to	1	percentage	point	lower	than	
private	companies.19	
Fiscal reforms have gained momentum, with visible changes 
in taxes and the budget and debt governance system. How-
ever, the measures taken so far have eased the pressures on 
local governments only temporarily, without providing them 
with stable sources of revenue that would allow them to ser-
vice their debt. In their final form, the reforms also lack the 
initially envisaged ‘pro-market’ component and lead to great-
er pressures on the banking sector. Beginning	in	2014,	a	num-
ber	of	measures	have	been	 taken	 in	China	 to	make	 it	 easier	 for	
local	governments	 to	service	 their	debt,	e.g.	by	abolishing	some	
restrictions	 on	 borrowing	 and	 opening	 the	 possibility	 for	 local	
governments	 to	 issue	 bonds,	 which	made	 them	 less	 dependent	
on	 the	 shadow	banking	 sector.	The	activities	of	 the	LGFVs	have	
also	 been	 regulated	 and	 limited.	Moreover,	 the	 central	 institu-
tions	have	launched	a	scheme,	worth	around	CNY	15	trillion,	to	
replace	high-interest	local	debt	with	bonds	that	are	easier	to	ser-
vice.20	The	initial	proposal	drafted	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	as-
sumed	that	a	large	market	would	be	created	for	local	government	
bonds,	which	would	be	bought	by	China’s	financial	institutions	on	
market	terms.	However,	facing	no	interest	in	such	risky	instru-
ments	on	the	part	of	banks	and	concerned	about	the	consequences	
of	possible	halting	of	local	government	spending,	the	government	
decided	 to	 force	 the	 state-owned	 banks	 to	 purchase	 the	 bonds.	
That	eased	the	short-term	pressure	on	the	local	governments,	but	
19	 The	comparison	concerns	the	major	state-owned	enterprises	that	have	ac-
cess	to	banking	credit.	Many	small	and	medium-sized	companies	still	have	
to	obtain	capital	from	the	shadow banking	sector,	which	offers	interests	rate	
of	up	to	20%	per	year.	See:	Wojciech	Maliszewski	et al.,	Resolving	China’s	
Corporate	Debt	Problem,	IMF Working Paper,	2016,	https://www.imf.org/ex-
ternal/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16203.pdf
20	 China	Said	to	Peg	Local	Debt	Swap	Program	at	15	Trillion	Yuan,	02.12.2015,	
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-02/china-said-to-peg-
local-government-debt-swap-program-at-15t-yuan-ihomcrti
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the	 measure	 was	 implemented	 on	 terms	 that	 contradicted	 the	
‘spirit	of	the	third	plenum’.
The	 central	 government	 has	 also	 introduced	 several	 changes	 to	
local-level	 budgetary	 planning	 rules,	 imposing	 regulations	 on	
the	drafting	of	multiannual	budgets	and	measures	to	improve	the	
transparency	of	 spending.	However,	 the	 reforms	have	not	been	
fully	implemented	because	of	the	resistance	of	local	government	
officials	who	tend	to	sabotage	co-operation	with	the	central	gov-
ernment,	 such	as	 in	assessing	 the	 real	volumes	of	debt	and	set-
ting	future	debt	limits.21	This	is	the	case	because	the	reforms	are	
taking	place	in	the	context	of	a	major	reform	of	the	taxation	sys-
tem,	which	has	undermined	the	budget	revenues	of	local	govern-
ments.	The	 reform	 entails	 a	wider	 application	 of	VAT,	 and	VAT	
revenues	are	channelled	to	the	central	budget	to	a	wider	degree	
than	revenues	from	the	previously	applicable	business	tax	were.	
Meanwhile,	work	on	 the	other	 taxes	 that	were	supposed	 to	 for-
tify	the	local	budgets	are	still	in	progress.	As	direct	transfers	from	
the	central	budget	have	not	increased	significantly,	the	widening	
budget	gaps	have	been	forcing	local	officials	to	look	for	financing	
beyond	the	official	channels.	
The reform of the centrally managed SOEs (yangqi) started 
with a significant, two-year delay. Owing to the large num-
ber of central institutions involved and their contradictory 
visions of what needs to be done, the detailed reform agenda 
is inconsistent and at times internally contradictory. So far 
there has been little progress on its implementation and the 
original objectives of the third plenum have been achieved to 
a small extent only. The	detailed	reform	plan	translating	the	ob-
jectives	set	by	the	third	plenum	into	concrete	measures	was	not	
published	until	2015.	Because	the	works	had	involved	a	number	
21	 Barry	Naughton,	Local	Debt	Restructuring:	A	case	of	Ongoing	Authoritar-
ian	Reform, China Leadership Monitor, No. 47,	2015,	http://www.hoover.org/
research/local-debt-restructuring-case-ongoing-authoritarian-reform	
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of	institutions	with	divergent	objectives,	the	original	agenda	was	
expanded	to	include	a	number	of	minor	changes,	some	of	which	
are	mutually	contradictory.	For	instance,	it	includes	proposals	to	
increase	 the	autonomy	of	 company	management	boards	as	well	
as	 a	 commitment	 to	 strengthen	 the	 role	 of	 the	 CPC	 structures	
in	nominating	managers.	The	official	documents	also	contain	no	
specific	 provisions	 on	 solutions	 that	 would	 be	 of	 fundamental	
importance	for	the	reform,	such	as	the	detailed	blueprint	for	the	
structure	of	the	managing	funds,	which	leaves	quite	a	lot	of	room	
for	interpretation	to	the	implementing	institutions.	
The implementation of the reform has also been delayed by 
conflicts over the division of responsibilities, surfacing dur-
ing the formulation of detailed reform plans:	for	instance,	the	
SOE	reform	was	designed	by	the	relatively	pro-market	Ministry	
of	Finance	but	its	 implementation,	after	a	 long	impasse,	became	
the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 government	 and	officials	with	 links	 to	
the	 economic	 bureaucracy,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 which	 its	momentum	
waned	and	the	pilot	projects	implemented	in	over	a	dozen	central-
ly	managed	SOEs	turned	out	to	be	very	moderate.22	Some	factors	
unrelated	to	the	political	process	have	also	played	a	role,	includ-
ing	the	chaos	in	China’s	exchange	markets,	which	blocked	one	of	
the	basic	channels	for	transferring	shares	to	the	private	sector	as	
part	of	 the	mixed	ownership	 reforms.	The	most	notable	 change	
implemented	 so	 far	 concerns	 the	 launch	 of	 a	 series	 of	mergers	
between	 the	centrally	managed	SOEs,	 leading	 to	 the	emergence	
of	 huge	 concerns,	 the	 expectation	 being	 that	 this	will	 improve	
their	efficiency.	However,	the	mergers	have	mainly	strengthened	
the	market	position	of	the	companies	involved,	calling	into	ques-
tion	the	intention	to	put	private	sector	on	an	equal	footing	with	
the	state-owned	sector.	Moreover,	 the	first	experiences	offer	no	
22	 State-owned	enterprises	at	a	crossroads:	Key	features	of	China’s	new	SOE	
reform,	Asia	Pacific	Foundation	of	Canada,	p.	14,	https://www.asiapacific.
ca/sites/default/files/filefield/soe-report-final.pdf	
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evidence	of	the	expected	synergies	and	profitability	gains.23	The	
obstacles	hindering	the	implementation	of	reforms	at	the	central	
level	have	also	affected	local	governments,	which	have	been	im-
plementing	their	own	version	of	the	reforms	in	the	locally	man-
aged	SOEs	 since	2013	 and	are	 carrying	out	 their	 own	pilot	pro-
grammes.	Because	of	Beijing’s	 inconsistent	policy,	 reforms	have	
been	postponed	and	–	in	the	absence	of	central	co-ordination	–	the	
dynamics	of	their	implementation	depends	on	the	prevailing	lo-
cal	 circumstances	 and	 balance	 of	 interests.24	 Consequently,	 the	
economically	 stronger	provinces,	 such	as	Guangdong	or	Chong-
qing,	have	been	more	committed	to	reform	and	faster	to	resolve	
problems	such	as	the	zombie	company	issue.	The	degree	of	change	
in	the	provinces	most	affected	by	stagnation	in	the	heavy	indus-
try,	such	as	Shanxi	or	Liaoning,	has	been	much	weaker	and	the	
changes	implemented	have	been	much	more	conservative.25 
The Chinese government responded to the stagnation of the 
third plenum’s agenda by launching a supply-side reform in 
2015.	The	 umbrella	 term	 encompasses	 various	 solutions	 which	
are	 expected	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	 economy	
but	are	based,	to	a	large	extent,	on	ad hoc	measures	implemented	
by	the	administration.	The	reform	has	five	pillars:	reducing	the	
debt	pile,	curbing	overproduction,	reducing	existing	production	
overcapacity,	 reducing	 oversupply	 in	 the	 property	market,	 and	
lowering	the	cost	of	doing	business.	Most	of	the	measures	taken	
to	 date	 concern	 overcapacity:	 the	 central	 institutions	 have	 set	
quotas	for	the	reduction	of	production	capacity	over	the	next	five	
years,	 especially	 in	 the	coal	mining	sector	 (500	million	 tonnes)	
and	steelmaking	(150	million	tonnes).	In	order	to	lower	the	cost	of	
doing	business,	the	reform	plans	envisage	various	tax	reductions	
23	 Why	China's	$1	Trillion	Merger	Makeover	Could	Fail,	08.09.2016,	https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-07/china-s-1-trillion-makeo-
ver-of-bloated-soes-attracts-skeptics	
24	 State-owned	enterprises	at	a	crossroads…,	op. cit.	
25	 Wojciech	Maliszewski	et al.,	op. cit.	
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intended	 to	 support	 businesses.	The	 new	 reform	 plans	 also	 en-
compass	 the	 economic	 administration	 reform	 launched	 back	 in	
2013	by	prime	minister	Li	Keqiang,	which	have	recently	lost	mo-
mentum.	It	aimed	to	address	the	problem	of	arbitrariness	of	bu-
reaucratic	decisions,	reduce	the	number	of	licences	and	permits	
and	delegate	decision-making,26	but	its	practical	implementation	
was	hampered	by	the	low	involvement	of	local	governments.	The	
supply-side	reform	is	a	relatively	new	initiative	and	as	such,	it	has	
not	been	fully	developed	yet,	but	in	2016	Beijing	clearly	identified	
its	implementation	as	a	priority.
26	 Baogang	Guo,	New	Trends	in	China’s	Administrative	Reform,	China currents,	
vol.	13,	No.	2,	2014;	http://www.chinacenter.net/2014/china_currents/13-2/
new-trends-in-chinas-administrative-reform/	
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iii. a nEw architEcturE for dEEpEning 
rEforms
Shortly	after	taking	the	lead	in	the	CPC	in	2012,	Xi	Jinping	started	
to	systematically	and	thoroughly	concentrate	power	in	his	hands.	
He	quickly	emancipated	himself	 from	the	 influences	of	his	pre-
decessors	and	put	himself	in	control	of	the	key	bodies	of	the	CPC,	
which	 also	 included	 taking	personal	 control	 of	 the	 army.27	This	
triggered	 a	 debate	 among	 foreign	 observers	 about	 the	 possible	
end	of	China’s	model	of	‘collective	leadership’	while	comparisons	
were	drawn	between	Xi’s	political	position	and	the	status	of	Deng	
Xiaoping	or	even	Mao	Zedong.28	The	new	architecture	for	deep-
ening	economic	reform,	created	after	2013,	was	fully	in	keeping	
with	that	trend,	making	Xi	Jinping	a	central	figure	in	the	entire	
process.
1. Reform as a way to combat vested interests
From	the	very	start,	the	new	Chinese	leadership	has	represented	
the	deepening	of	economic	reforms	as	a	battle	against	the	vested	
interests	 (liyi jituan or	 jide liyi)	which	had	emerged	at	 the	 inter-
section	of	the	state	and	the	economy.	In	view	of	China’s	endemic	
corruption,	the	rise	of	such	groups	was	an	inevitable	consequence	
of	the	Chinese	model,	in	which	the	state	plays	the	leading	role	in	
economic	development.	For	large	sections	of	the	bureaucracy	and	
the	private	businesses	with	links	to	the	government,	preserving	
the	status quo,	i.e.	the	existing	level	of	regulation,	the	privileged	
position	 of	 SOEs	 and	 the	 state-dominated	 financial	 system	 is	
27	 In	the	past,	the	leadership	of	the	CPC’s	Central	Military	Commission	was	not	
automatically	handed	over	to	the	new	CPC	secretary	general,	which	allowed	
the	real	leader	to	keep	behind-the-scenes	influence	(from	which	both	Deng	
and	Jiang	Zemin	benefited).	
28	 That	status	was	partly	sanctioned	when	Xi	was	given	the	title	of	the	party’s	
‘core’	leader	(hexin), previously	granted	only	to	Mao,	Deng	and	Jiang	Zemin.	
See:	Chris	Buckley,	China’s	Communist	Party	Declares	Xi	Jinping	‘Core’	Lead-
er,	New York Times,	27.10.2016,	https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/
asia/xi-jinping-china.html?_r=0	
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necessary	 for	 their	 success	 and	ability	 to	keep	enriching	 them-
selves.	Those	groups	should	be	also	seen	as	a	 force	 interested	 in	
a	continuation	of	the	practice	of	maintaining	the	economy	under	
conditions	of	constant	fiscal	and	monetary	stimulus,	which	is	un-
sustainable,	yet,	with	the	lucrative	projects	it	involves,	generates	
massive	benefits	for	the	officials	and	companies	involved.	In	this	
context,	the	Chinese	central-level	bureaucratic	circles’	resistance	
is	also	an	obstacle	to	reform	because	the	state’s	withdrawal	from	
the	 economy	 will	 undermine	 their	 political	 position	 and	 curb	
their	powers,	which	 in	 itself	may	 trigger	opposition	 to	 the	pro-
jected	changes.
The	economic	reform	agenda	proposed	during	the	 third	plenum	
in	2013	aims	at	reducing	the	state’s	control	of	the	economy,	which	
will	considerably	restrain	the	opportunities	to	derive	extraordi-
nary	benefits	 from	access	 to	power.	Thus, the implementation 
of the reforms announced by the new leadership inevitably 
opens a political conflict within the CPC, which will require 
the leaders to become actively involved in overcoming the ad-
ministration’s resistance at the level of central, provincial 
and local institutions and resistance from the huge sector 
of SOEs.	From	the	moment	he	took	power,	Xi	Jinping	has	made	it	
clear	that	the	easy	phase	of	reforms	which	made	everyone	satis-
fied	was	now	over,	and	has	presented	the	resumption	of	reforms	
as	‘navigating	a	deep-water	zone’.29	He	has	also	described	the	re-
form	process	as	a	revolutionary	struggle	against	vested	interests,	
in	which	one	would	need	to	use	‘real	spears	and	swords’.30	Shortly	
after	his	inauguration	in	March	2013,	prime	minister	Li	Keqiang	
explicitly	warned	against	the	interest	groups	who	would	be	seek-
ing	 to	 block	 the	 reforms,	 pledging	 to	 fight	 a	 tough	 battle	 that	
29	 Xi	says	China's	reform	enters	deep-water	zone,	Xinhua,	01.04.2014,	http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/01/c_133230720.htm	
30	 The	Chinese	idiom真刀真枪	(zhen dao zhen qiang) means	serious	action,	but	in	
this	context	it	might	be	interpreted	more	literally.	See:	习近平：改革是动既得
利益 不真刀真枪干不行, China	Net,	28.06.2016,	http://www.china.com.cn/
news/2016-06/28/content_38759911.htm	
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would	be	like	‘cutting	off	one’s	own	hand’.31	Pointing	to	the	admin-
istration,	he	warned	about	the	resistance	of	people	who	would	be	
losing	power	and	influence	as	access	to	the	markets	becomes	lib-
eralised	and	competition	increases.32	
Seeing	the	reform	as	a	battle	against	vested	interests	has	also	be-
come	one	of	 the	dominant	views	 in	China’s	press	and	economic	
debate.	 The	 press	 regularly	 publishes	 expert	 comments	 which	
link	the	vested	interests	operating	in	China	with	the	discrimina-
tion	against	the	private	sector	or	the	growing	inequalities.	Vested	
interests	are	also	often	blamed	for	the	delays	or	failure	of	specific	
reform	projects.33	Finally,	influential	Chinese	economists	and	eco-
nomic	journalists	including	Chi	Fulin	of	the	Chinese	Institute	for	
Reform	and	Development,	Li	Yining	of	the	University	of	Beijing34	
or	 Hu	 Shuli,	 editor-in-chief	 of	 China’s	 leading	 business	weekly	
Caixin,	point	to	the	existence	of	interest	groups	as	an	obstacle	to	
China’s	further	development.	
Unlike	the	reforms	implemented	by	Deng	Xiaoping	in	the	1980s	
and	1990s,	the	conflict	opened	by	the	Xi-Li	duo	is	not	strictly	ideo-
logical	in	nature.	Back	then,	the	reformers’	main	opponents	were	
the	conservative,	communist	party	elites	while	the	bureaucracy	
at	 various	 levels,	 especially	 at	 the	 local	 and	 provincial	 level,	 to	
which	the	reforms	offered	opportunities	of	enrichment,	was	a	po-
tential	ally.35	Today’s	situation	is	the	opposite.	Planning	the	specif-
ics	and	implementing	the	agenda	of	the	third	plenum	will	require	
31	 自上而下的改革,	 China Daily,	 09.11.2013,	 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2013cp	c	t	p	s	/	2013-11/09/content_17093720.htm
32	 李克强：改革会触动利益会动“奶酪”但我们义无反顾,	CPC	News,	13.03.2014,	
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0313/c164113-24626615.html	
33	 Xinhua	 Insight:	China's	new	reforms	must	breach	vested	 interests,	Xin-
hua,	 04.11.2014,	 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-
11/04/c_132857921.htm	
34	 Vested	interests,	inertia	"hard	nuts"	in	China's	reform,	Xinhua,	06.03.2014,	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/06/c_133166965.htm
35	 Willy	Wo-Lap	Lam,	Chinese	politics	in	the	Era	of	Xi	Jinping,	Routledge,	New	
York	2015,	p.	152.
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overcoming	 the	 resistance	 of	 the	 Chinese	 administration	 at	 all	
levels	and	mobilising	its	members.	The current CPC leadership 
views the vested interests embedded in the Chinese state ap-
paratus as the main opponents of reforms, who may actively 
or passively resist the projected thorough restructuring of 
China’s economy.	The activities of the leadership in Beijing 
have been subordinated to the logic of internal conflict since 
2012, necessitating the development of new tools to discipline 
the administration cadres and tighten control of the reform 
process.	
2. Establishment of the Central Leading Group 
for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms
The	new	Chinese	leadership	decided	to	use	the	structures	of	the	
Communist	 Party	 of	 China	 as	 the	 basic	 instrument	 in	 gaining	
control	of	the	economic	reforms.	To	this	end,	it	used	the	network	
of	so-called	leading	small	groups	(lingdao xiaozu)	existing	within	
the	CPC	Central	Committee,	i.e.	the	permanent	or	temporary	in-
formal	forums	grouping	the	leaders	of	the	key	bodies	in	the	CPC	
and	the	state	administration,	whose	role	is	to	initiate	and	imple-
ment	policies	and	build	consensus	at	the	top	tiers	of	power.36	Be-
cause	they	are	embedded	in	the	central	structures	of	power,	the	
leading	groups	of	the	CPC	Central	Committee	play	a	crucial	role.	
More	than	a	dozen	such	groups	exist	currently,	dealing	with	key	
issues	ranging	 from	finance	and	 the	economy	to	party	develop-
ment,	propaganda	and	 ideology,	and	 to	 foreign	policy,	 cyber	 se-
curity	and	the	army.	The	formula	of	an	informal	leading	group	as	
a	vehicle	of	co-ordination	is	very	common	in	the	Chinese	political	
system	–	several	dozen	such	groups	work	with	the	State	Council	
(government)	of	China	and	within	the	Chinese	People’s	Liberation	
36	 The	first	leading	small	groups	were	established	back	in	the	late	1950s,	but	
they	did	not	become	an	important	tool	for	the	co-ordination	of	reforms	until	
the	Deng	Xiaoping	period.	The	groups	were	gradually	developed	and	refined	
by	successive	generations	of	Chinese	leaders.
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Army.37	Groups	are	also	often	established	at	 lower	 levels	of	gov-
ernment,	including	the	provincial	level,	or	within	individual	cen-
tral	institutions.	
Xi Jinping’s rise to power within the CPC was followed by 
a re-construction of the network of leading groups operating 
within the CPC Central Committee, as a result of which the 
groups gained a bigger role in the process of economic poli-
cy development.	The	so-called	Central	Leading	Small	Group	for	
Comprehensively	 Deepening	 Reforms,	 established	 by	 the	 third	
plenum	in	2013	to	implement	its	reform	agenda	to	2020,	became	
a	 pivotal	 element	 of	 the	 new	 architecture	 (hereafter:	 Leading	
Group	 for	Deepening	Reforms).	 It	 is	 an	 elaborate	 structure	 and	
has	 its	own	working	 sub-groups	 in	 charge	of	particular	 reform	
areas,	including	a	Subgroup	on	the	Economic	System	and	Ecologi-
cal	Civilisation,	responsible	for	economic	affairs.	The	Group	also	
holds	 a	 senior	position	 role	 in	 relation	 to	 some	existing	 leading	
groups	 and	 has	 taken	 over	 some	 of	 their	 responsibilities.38	The	
Group	meets	 regularly,	 currently	 every	month,	 and	 has	 a	 rela-
tively	 small	 secretariat	 in	 charge	 of	 organising	 work.	 Like	 the	
other	groups,	it	has	a	strongly	hierarchical	structure	in	which	the	
chair,	in	this	case	Xi	Jinping	himself,	holds	a	dominant	position.39
The intention of the Chinese leadership was to make the Lead-
ing Group for Deepening Reforms a key element in the eco-
nomic reform process.	Its	tasks	include	defining	the	directions	of	
reform,	initiating	specific	solutions	and,	importantly,	‘overseeing	
37	 Alice	Miller,	The	CCP	Central	Committee’s	 Leading	Small	Groups,	China 
Leadership Monitor,	No.	26,	Hoover	Institute,	2008,	http://www.hoover.org/
research/ccp-central-committees-leading-small-groups	
38	 This	is	particularly	important	in	the	case	of	the	Leading	Group	for	Finance	
and	Economy	in	charge	of	regularly	reviewing	the	government’s	economic	
policy	and	setting	priorities	for	China’s	five-year	plans.
39	 The	Group’s	proceedings	are	not	fully	public,	e.g.	not	all	details	of	the	re-
forms	discussed	are	publicly	disclosed.	Nevertheless,	the	lists	of	topics	on	the	
agenda	and	of	the	group’s	members,	as	well	as	media	reports	on	the	Group’s	
meetings	do	provide	some	knowledge	about	the	way	it	functions.
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and	 pushing	 forward’	 the	 implementation.40	 Available	 informa-
tion	suggests	that	the	Group	has	been	successfully	accomplishing	
those	tasks,	at	least	in	the	procedural	dimension.	As	one	of	the	first	
outcomes	of	its	work,	the	Group	has	compiled	a	list	of	366	specific	
reforms	to	be	implemented	by	2020;	while	the	list	itself	is	not	pub-
licly	available,	the	reforms	are	being	successively	initiated	accord-
ing	the	Chinese	media.	The	Group’s	activities	are	focused	on	initi-
ating	reforms,	while	the	task	of	drafting	detailed	specific	projects	
is	 delegated	 to	 other	 specialised	 leading	 groups	 and	 then	 to	 the	
lower	levels	of	the	party	and	the	state	administration,	as	well	as	
to	individual	central,	provincial	and	local	institutions.	The	Group’s	
secretariat	appoints	working	groups	comprised	of	institutions	in-
volved	in	the	reform.	The	Group	subsequently	gives	its	opinion	on	
the	drafts	and	regularly	oversees	the	implementation	process.	In	
the	years	2014-2015,	more	 than	one	hundred	different	measures	
were	on	the	Group’s	agenda,	of	which	around	one	third	concerned	
economic	reforms.41	It	is	notable	that	the	Leading	Group	deals	not	
only	with	issues	of	fundamental	importance	for	the	Chinese	econ-
omy,	such	as	the	reforms	of	taxation	or	SOEs,	but	also	very	specific	
and	relatively	minor	changes	such	as	the	establishment	of	a	sys-
tem	to	locate	lost	ID	documents	of	Chinese	nationals.
The Leading Group for Deepening Reforms has become not 
only a new channel for initiating and controlling reforms, 
but also a basic tool for co-ordination between the central 
institutions of China’s administration and for overcom-
ing the expected resistance to change –	 that	 is	 because	 even	
a	secretary	general	such	as	Xi	Jinping,	who	is	considered	to	be	in	
a	very	strong	position,	does	not	have	fully	discretional	powers	in	
making	key	nominations	 in	the	state	administration,	especially	
40	 Barry	Naughton,	It’s	All	in	the	Execution:	Struggling	with	the	Reform	Agen-
da,	China Leadership Monitor,	No.	45,	Hoover	Institute,	2014,	http://www.
hoover.org/research/its-all-execution-struggling-reform-agenda	
41	 Lance	L.	P.	Gore,	Xi	Jinping’s	Reform	Leading	Group:	Two	years	in	Operation,	
IPP	Review,	11.05.2016,	http://ippreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/
id/134.html	
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during	 his	 first	 term.	 Appointments	 in	 the	 administration	 are	
decided	by	the	party’s	highest	bodies,	in	particular,	the	Politburo	
of	the	Central	Committee	(a	key	body	comprised	of	25	people).	Its	
current	composition	was	not	Xi’s	decision	–	it	reflects	the	party’s	
balance	of	power	back	in	2012.	Consequently,	Xi	Jinping	does	not	
have	unrestrained	freedom	to	build	a	strong	pro-reform	team	in	
the	key	 central	 institutions.	Many	 important	posts	 in	 the	State	
Council	 (government)	 and	 key	 institutions	 have	 been	 occupied	
by	people	representing	the	interests	of	the	bureaucracy	respon-
sible	for	economic	planning	or	the	interests	of	state-owned	com-
panies,	 or	 indeed	 officials	 burdened	 with	 corruption	 links,	 i.e.	
groups	 less	 enthusiastic	 about	 reform,	 which	 may	 potentially	
delay	any	change	 in	 the	 status quo.42	With	 the	 leaders	of	all	key	
state	institutions	(who	are	all	also	CPC	members)	participating	in	
the	Leading	Group	for	Deepening	Reforms,	all	 the	main	centres	
of	power	concerned	by	economic	matters	are	represented	within	
it,	including	the	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	
(the	main	planning	body),	the	central	bank,	SASAC	(the	institu-
tion	overseeing	SOEs),	as	well	as	the	ministries	of	finance,	educa-
tion,	industry,	trade	and	the	environment.43	By	bringing	together	
all	the	actors	crucial	for	the	reforms	within	one	forum,	the	party	
leaders	have	created	a	powerful	tool	to	co-ordinate,	build	compro-
mise	and	transfer	knowledge,	while	at	the	same	time	overcoming	
the	resistance	of	 the	central	bureaucracy	 to	 the	extent	 the	pro-
reform	 fraction’s	 strength	 allows.	The	 personal	 involvement	 of	
the	CPC	leaders	in	the	political	process,	i.e.	the	interventions	into	
the	course	of	reforms	that	they	can	make	in	the	Group’s	meetings,	
allows	them	to	amplify	the	power	of	political	persuasion	of	indi-
vidual	institutions	and	officials.
42	 For	instance,	the	positions	of	deputy	prime	ministers	were	taken	by	Wang	
Yang,	the	former	chief	of	the	SASAC	(the	institution	overseeing	the	largest	
state-owned	companies)	and	Ma	Kai,	a	man	with	links	to	the	National	Devel-
opment	and	Reform	Commission	which	often	advocates	state	interventions.	
43	 The	Group	also	includes	14	of	the	25	members	of	the	Politburo	and	4	of	the	7	
members	of	the	Standing	Committee.	In	total,	it	has	43	members.	See:	Lance	
L.	P.	Gore,	op. cit.
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The	leading	groups	embedded	within	the	CPC	have	also	become	
an	 important	 channel	 for	 co-ordinating	 reforms	 and	 overcom-
ing	the	resistance	of	the	bureaucratic	cadres	at	lower	levels	of	the	
state	administration.	Within	months	of	the	third	plenum,	Lead-
ing	Small	Groups	for	Comprehensively	Deepening	Reforms	were	
created	at	the	provincial	level,	in	the	main	government	agencies,	
China’s	 largest	 cities	 and	 in	 some	of	 the	 state-owned	enterpris-
es.44	Their	 structure	 largely	mirrors	 that	 of	 the	 Leading	 Group	
for	Deepening	Reforms	created	by	the	CPC	Central	Committee;	in	
the	personal	dimension	they	bring	together	the	local	party	elites	
and	key	officials,	and	also	have	specialised	sub-groups	(in	some	
cases	the	subgroups	are	more	elaborate	and	adjusted	to	the	local	
needs)	and	their	own	secretariats.	The	meetings	of	the	provincial	
leading	 groups	 take	 place	 regularly	 (most	 groups	 have	 already	
held	around	20	meetings	 each),	 and	 the	matters	discussed	 con-
cern	both	the	implementation	of	the	guidelines	coming	from	the	
Central	Leading	Group	for	the	Deepening	of	Reforms	and	develop-
ment	of	local	projects.	Importantly,	procedural	powers	are	again	
concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	party	secretaries	–	at	the	provin-
cial	level	it	is	usually	them,	and	not	the	governors,	i.e.	administra-
tion	chiefs,	who	are	at	the	helm	of	the	leading	groups.45	The	aim	
is	to	enable	a	similar	mechanism	as	at	the	central	level	where	the	
authority	of	high-ranking	party	members	 is	a	way	 to	overcome	
the	resistance	of	officials.	
3. The party’s role: to discipline and mobilise
The	activities	of	the	CPC	Central	Commission	for	Discipline	Inspec-
tion	(hereafter	Central	Disciplinary	Commission)	are	another	tool	
which	has	been	built	within	the	CPC	structures	to	discipline	the	
44	 According	to	various	estimates,	around	800	such	groups	were	established	at	
various	levels	in	2014.	See:	Barry	Naughton,	‘Deepening	Reform’:	The	Organi-
zation	and	the	Emerging	Strategy,	China Leadership Monitor,	No.	44,	Hoover	
Institute,	2014,	http://www.hoover.org/research/deepening-reform-organ-
ization-and-emerging-strategy	
45	 Ibidem.
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bureaucracy	and	indirectly,	to	extend	the	party	leadership’s	con-
trol	over	the	implementation	of	reforms.46	Led	by	Wang	Qishan,	
a	member	of	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee	and	one	of	Xi	Jin-
ping’s	most	trusted	aides,	the	Commission	launched	the	so-called	
anti-corruption	campaign	in	2013	and	has	since	been	conducting	
very	comprehensive	scrutiny	of	officials	suspected	of	corruption;	
the	Commission’s	proceedings	have	led	in	many	cases	to	expulsion	
from	the	party	or	imprisonment	sentences.	Anti-corruption	cam-
paigns	have	been	launched	in	China	before,	serving	to	consolidate	
power,	wage	inter-faction	wars	within	the	CPC	or	to	strengthen	
the	 party’s	 popularity	 by	 imposing	 exemplary	 punishments	 on	
corrupt	officials.	The	same	elements	are	also	present	in	the	anti-
corruption	campaign	launched	by	Xi	Jinping	in	2014.47	However, 
the scale and duration of the present campaign are unprec-
edented, which indicates that the campaign is designed as 
a tool to change the political status quo in China, and that is 
very significant for the prospects of implementing economic 
reforms. Unlike	the	previous	 ‘wars’	on	corruption	(which	typi-
cally	gained	momentum	when	a	change	of	leadership	was	about	
to	take	place),	the	current	campaign	has	not	lost	momentum	four	
years	 on,48	 and	 the	 aim	of	Wang	Qishan	 is	 to	 build	permanent,	
long-term	mechanisms	for	the	‘self-purification’	of	the	party	into	
46	 The	Commission	is	not	part	of	the	Chinese	administration	of	justice	–	the	
investigations	are	conducted	by	party	bodies,	but	the	measures	employed	
include	house	arrest	and	interrogations.	Selected	cases	are	referred	to	the	
prosecution	authorities	and	end	in	imprisonment	sentences.
47	 The	fight	with	the	‘tigers’,	of	whom	around	150	have	been	convicted	or	ex-
cluded	from	the	party,	should	be	seen	as	a	way	for	Xi	Jinping	to	consolidate	
his	grip	on	power	within	the	party.	Many	experts	point	to	the	fact	that	the	
anti-corruption	campaign	has	not	directly	affected	any	of	Xi’s	political	allies.
48	 According	to	various	estimates,	in	the	years	2013-2016,	the	Central	Com-
mission	for	Discipline	Inspection	investigated	corruption	allegations	against	
100,000	to	200,000	officials	of	various	levels,	some	of	whom	were	excluded	
from	the	party	or	convicted	for	corruption.	In	2015	alone,	around	330,000	
people	faced	disciplinary	proceedings	(not	necessarily	linked	to	corruption),	
and	of	this	number,	14,000	were	charged	by	the	prosecution	authorities. See:	
中纪委晒2015反腐大数据：去年全国处分33.6万人,	Sina,	15.01.2016,	http://news.
sina.com.cn/c/2016-01-15/doc-ifxnrahr8329230.shtml
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the	Chinese	political	system.49	The	scope	of	the	campaign	is	also	
unprecedented	as	it	reaches	both	the	 ‘tigers’	(high-level	officials	
and	party	members)	 and	 the	 ‘flies’	 (lower-ranking	 officials	 and	
party	members),	to	use	Xi	Jinping’s	metaphor.	
The	anti-corruption	campaign	has	played	an	important	role	in	re-
shuffles	within	the	central	institutions	in	charge	of	economic	gov-
ernance,	stepping	up	pressure	on	the	bureaucracy	and	enabling	
rapid	replacement	of	some	officials.	For	the	leadership	in	Beijing,	
stepping	up	pressure	on	the	bureaucracy	is	also	a	way	to	improve	
the	 quality	 of	 governance	 of	 SOE	 assets	 and	budget	 spending.50	
The	Central	Disciplinary	Commission	has	been	active	 in	 the	 in-
stitutions	 in	 charge	 of	 economic	 regulations,	 as	well	 as	 several	
state-owned	 companies.	The	 anti-corruption	 campaign	 has	 tar-
geted	the	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission,	which	
is	the	chief	planning	office	and	the	market	regulator	for	many	sec-
tors.	In	the	years	2012-2013,	investigations	were	launched	against	
many	 key	 officials	 in	 charge	 of	 price	 regulation	 and	 the	NDRC	
deputy	chief,	Liu	Tienan,	who	was	in	charge	of	the	energy	sector.	
Among	those	arrested	was	Jiang	Jiemin,	the	chief	of	SASAC,	the	
government	agency	overseeing	the	state-owned	enterprises	con-
trolled	 by	 the	 government.	 In	 2014,	 state-owned	 companies	 be-
came	the	campaign’s	targets,	with	investigations	opened	in	every	
one	of	the	112	centrally-managed	concerns,51	 in	the	aftermath	of	
which	many	bosses	of	the	largest	oil,	energy	and	extraction	com-
panies	were	removed	from	their	positions,	as	were	the	chiefs	of	
several	banks.	
The anti-corruption campaign has become a means of exert-
ing systematic pressure on the bureaucracy and accelerating 
49	 王岐山在十八届中央纪委六次全会上的工作报告,	Xinhua,	24.01.2016,	http://
www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201601/t20160124_73389.html
50	 Jonathan	Fenby,	China's	corruption	probe	bares	its	teeth,	BBC,	20.02.2015,	
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-31503967	
51	 China's	state-assets	manager	gets	even	tougher	on	graft,	Xinhua,	20.01.2016,	
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-01/20/content_19354480.htm	
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the rotation of cadres, while at the same time building up Bei-
jing’s political influence at the local level. According	 to	some	
estimates,	around	90%	of	the	audits	were	conducted	at	the	level	
of	provinces	or	lower.52	The	‘purge’	in	local	institutions	and	party	
bodies	serves	a	complex	set	of	objectives:	it	is	a	reaction	to	the	loos-
ening	of	control	over	party	structures	and	their	progressing	ero-
sion,	as	well	as	to	the	impunity	of	local	officials,	which	has	been	
undermining	the	party’s	legitimacy.	The	instruments	used	in	the	
campaign	indirectly	help	to	centralise	the	Chinese	political	sys-
tem,	making	 the	party	 structures	more	hierarchical,	which	 in-
fluences	the	functioning	of	the	administration.53	The	disciplinary	
measures	and	reshuffles	should	therefore	be	treated	as	a	way	of	
‘clearing	the	field’	for	the	implementation	of	reforms	and	break-
ing	the	resistance	of	the	groups	sustaining	the	status quo.54	
52	 Anna	L.	Ahlers	i	Matthias	Stepan,	Top-level	design	and	local-level	paralysis:	
Local	politics	in	times	of	political	centralization,	[w:]	Sebastian	Heilmann	et 
al.,	China’s	core	executive:	Leadership	styles, structures	and	processes	under	
Xi	Jinping,	MERICS,	2016,	http://www.merics.org/?id=1065	
53	 In	the	past,	the	Commission’s	activities	at	the	local	level	used	to	be	controlled	
by	the	local	party	committees,	which	led	to	obvious	conflicts	of	interest	and	
rendered	effective	control	 impossible.	The	reorganisation	carried	out	by	
Wang	Qishan	has	resulted	in	the	formation	of	a	much	more	hierarchical	
structure	in	which	the	local	commission	bosses	and	their	deputies	are	ap-
pointed	by	the	higher	levels,	to	which	they	directly	report,	while	the	ultimate	
oversight	is	conducted	by	the	Central	Discipline	Inspection	Commission.	
54	 This	interpretation	is	substantiated	in	view	of	statements	by	the	Chinese	
leaders	and	the	message	coming	from	the	state-owned	press.	See:	New	stage	
in	anti-corruption	Fight,	China Daily,	5.04.2014,	http://www.china.org.cn/
opinion/2014-03/05/content_31676604.htm	
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iv. thE main challEngEs for rEform
The	 reform	 implementation	 pathway	 adopted	 after	 the	 third	
plenum	in	2013	 largely	relies	on	the	structures	of	 the	Commu-
nist	Party	of	China.	Even	though	the	party’s	main	bodies	have	
also	 previously	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 reforms,	 that	 role	
was	largely	limited	to	setting	general	directions	and	taking	key	
political	decisions.	The	strong	powers	of	the	Leading	Group	for	
Comprehensively	 Deepening	 Reforms	 and	 its	 significant	 role	
in	 the	 reform	 ‘transmission	 belt’	 amount	 to	 a	 partial	 adjust-
ment	of	China’s	original	model	of	economic	policy	development.	
Embedded	 in	 the	 CPC	 structures,	 the	 Group	 has	 been	 given	
an	 important	and	partly	 formalised	role	 in	 the	process,	which	
also	 includes	 the	power	 to	 initiate	reforms,	delegate	 tasks	and	
oversee	progress.	This means that – to some degree – the key 
competences have been shifted from the domain of the state 
(government) to the domain of the party, thus disrupting 
the reform implementation mechanisms which have been 
in place for years. The	very	process	has	simultaneously	become	
more	centralised,	with	 the	CPC	 leadership	gaining	more	 influ-
ence	on	the	specific	shape	of	reforms,	at	the	expense	of	the	lo-
cal	administrations.	And	finally,	the	new	model	has	also	given	
Xi	 Jinping	personally	more	 influence	 on	 the	 directions	 of	 eco-
nomic	 policy.	The	 systemic	 changes	 implemented	 by	 the	 Xi-Li	
team	have	brought	about	many	negative	consequences	which	go	
towards	explaining	the	weakness	of	the	implementation	of	key	
reforms	from	the	third	plenum’s	agenda.
1. Disruption of the political process
The	so-called	top-level	design	(dingceng sheji),	i.e.	the	idea	of	cen-
tralising	the	reform	process	by	granting	the	government	in	Bei-
jing	wider	competences	in	shaping	the	reforms,	has	been	one	of	
the	 basic	 concepts	 accompanying	 the	 concentration	 of	 control	
of	the	reforms	in	the	hands	of	the	CPC	top	 leadership.	 It	entails	
a	partial	departure	from	the	decentralised	model	relying	on	local	
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experimenting,	 which	 had	 been	 in	 place	 for	 several	 decades.55	
Even	 though	 that	 model	 is	 still	 in	 use	 in	 many	 spheres	 of	 the	
state’s	 functioning,	 it	has	been	 implemented	where	 it	 applies	 to	
the	key	issues	named	in	the	third	plenum’s	agenda.	Now	it	is	the	
central	 leadership	 that	 defines	more	 details	 of	 the	 reform	 pro-
grammes,	 starting	 from	 initiatives	 within	 the	 central	 Leading	
Group	for	Deepening	Reforms,	 the	specifics	of	which	are	subse-
quently	defined	by	the	selected	central	institutions.	The	role	of	the	
local	governments,	organised	into	local	Leading	Groups	for	Deep-
ening	Reforms,	is	to	‘respond’	to	the	reforms	and	develop	innova-
tive	solutions	that	fit	the	local	conditions.	This	shift	of	emphasis	
in	the	political	process	disturbs	the	balance	in	relations	between	
the	 central	 government	 and	 local	 administration	 (discussed	 in	
the	next	section),	and	places	a	greater	responsibility	for	detailed	
policy	design	upon	the	central	institutions	in	Beijing.
To	 date,	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Leading	 Group	 for	 the	 Deepening	
of	Reforms,	which	has	absorbed	the	biggest	share	of	the	powers	
transferred	in	connection	with	the	top-level design	concept,	have	
revealed	several	important	defects	of	the	new	architecture	for	the	
implementation	of	reforms.	An	important	role	in	the	reform	pro-
cess	has	been	given	to	an	only	loosely	formalised	body	convening	
relatively	infrequently	and	embedded	within	the	CPC	rather	than	
the	state	administration.	While	the	Group	does	have	a	secretariat,	
its	organisational	capacity	is	limited	and	the	secretariat’s	work	is	
limited	to	setting	meeting	agendas	and	initiating	co-operation	be-
tween	selected	institutions.56	Many	observers	have	noted	that	the	
structure	works	relatively	slowly	and	fails	to	foster	an	adequate	
55	 It	provided	relatively	wide	freedom	to	the	local	and	provincial	administra-
tions	in	developing	reforms,	which	has	led,	inter	alia,	to	considerable	institu-
tional	differentiation	between	China’s	regions.	For	example,	different	parts	
of	China	operate	different	social	security	systems.
56	 Barry	Naughton,	After	the	Third	Plenum:	Economic	Reform	Revival	Moves	
toward	Implementation,	China Leadership Monitor,	No.	43,	Hoover	Institute,	
2014,	http://www.hoover.org/research/after-third-plenumplenum-econom-
ic-reform-revival-moves-toward-implementation
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sequencing	of	reforms.57	Specific	solutions,	initiated	by	the	Group	
or	put	forward	by	other	institutions,	are	negotiated	between	the	
key	centres	of	power	and	moved	to	the	implementation	phase	only	
when	‘the	conditions	are	ripe’,	as	emphasised	in	many	documents.	
As	a	result,	specific	projects	get	approved	by	the	top	party	leader-
ship	 in	a	 random	and	unsynchronised	manner,	which	prevents	
synergies	and	jeopardises	the	success	of	reforms	in	areas	where	
changes	 should	 be	 implemented	 in	 a	 meticulously	 crafted	 se-
quence	(such	as	the	finance	sector).	Because	of	the	multiplicity	of	
actors	involved,	and	potentially	also	a	piling	up	of	tasks	in	a	situ-
ation	of	limited	human	resources,	many	important	projects	have	
been	stuck	in	the	‘transmission	belt’	–	of	the	several	hundred	top-
ics	on	the	agenda,	a	little	over	a	dozen	have	entered	implementa-
tion	phase	as	of	now.58
The	new	tools	to	control	reforms	have	been	embedded	within	the	
existing	structures	of	 the	party,	 i.e.	within	the	 leading	groups	
whose	original	functions	concerned	co-ordination	and	control,	
but	which	 did	 not	 have	 the	 institutional	 capacity,	 staff	 or	 ex-
pertise	needed	 to	 formulate	 specific	 reforms	 on	 their	 own.	As	
a	result,	the	decision-making	centre	located	within	the	Leading	
Group	for	the	Deepening	of	Reforms	has	been	forced	to	rely	fully	
on	the	existing	state	and	party	institutions.	This	has	created	op-
portunities	 for	 reforms	 to	 be	 hijacked	 by	 groups	 interested	 in	
preserving	the	status quo,	which	can	use	means	such	as	propos-
ing	 illusory	 change	which,	 in	 reality,	would	keep	 the	 existing	
power	relations	 in	place,	delaying	procedures	or	even	sabotag-
ing	certain	specific	solutions.	This	scenario	could	be	observed	in	
the	case	of	one	of	the	absolutely	key	reforms,	i.e.	the	SOE	reform.	
The	draft	mixed	ownership	reform,	formulated	by	the	Ministry	
of	Finance	at	the	request	of	the	Leading	Group	for	Deepening	Re-
forms	in	the	‘spirit	of	the	third	plenum’,	very	clearly	ran	coun-
ter	 to	 the	 proposal	 promoting	 continued	 interventionism,	 put	
57	 Ibidem.
58	 Lance	L.	P.	Gore,	op. cit.
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forward	by	SASAC,	i.e.	the	institution	which	would	be	in	charge	
of	the	ultimate	implementation	of	the	reform	at	the	central	level.	
Ultimately	this	contradiction	had	to	be	resolved	by	the	govern-
ment,	 in	 which	 the	 existing	 economic	 bureaucracy,	 including	
the	former	SASAC	chief	and	currently	member	of	government,	
held	an	influential	position.	
Even	though	the	reform’s	failure	is	attributable	to	a	complex	nex-
us	of	causes	(including	chaos	in	the	capital	markets	and	lack	of	en-
thusiasm	on	the	part	of	the	private	sector),	the	reason	why	it	lost	
momentum	may	be	linked	to	the	failure	of	the	political	process.	
The	complexity	of	that	process	also	dilutes	responsibility	for	the	
fate	of	reforms,	thereby	undermining	accountability.59	While	the	
Leading	Group	for	the	Deepening	of	Reforms	may	be	regarded	as	
an	effective	instrument	to	initiate	reforms	and,	to	the	extent	that	
the	 top	CPC	 leadership	 is	willing	and	able	 to	do	 so,	 amplify	 the	
influence	of	selected	reformers,	its	capacity	at	the	level	of	reform	
implementation	is	much	more	limited.
2. Resistance from the local bureaucracy
The	methods	adopted	by	the	leadership	in	Beijing	to	regain	control	
of	the	state	apparatus,	based	on	a	mass	mobilisation	of	the	bureau-
cratic	cadres	via	party	channels,	do	not	ensure	full	involvement	
of	the	 local	bureaucracy	in	the	implementation	of	the	third	ple-
num’s	reforms. As a result, the reforms, which are character-
ised by a conflict of interests between the central authorities 
and the local governments, have been facing passive resist-
ance. Meanwhile,	the	involvement	of	local	governments	is	crucial	
for	the	implementation	of	the	third	plenum’s	reform	agenda	since	
they	play	a	key	role	in	the	entire	process.	Even	if	the	previous	re-
form	model	based	on	local	initiatives	and	experiments	has	been	
59	 Barry	Naughton,	 Shifting	 structures	 and	 processes	 in	 economic	 policy-
making	at	the	centre	[in:]	Sebastian	Heilmann	et al.,	China’s	core	executive:	
Leadership	styles,	structures	and	processes	under	Xi	Jinping,	MERICS,	2016,	
http://www.merics.org/?id=1065	
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partly	 revised,	 in	 the	context	of	 the	decentralisation	which	has	
been	underway	in	China	since	the	1980s	the	local	administration	
remains	the	most	important	actor.	This	is	because,	in	the	final	im-
plementation	of	 institutional	changes,	 it	has	the	executive	com-
petences	and	the	knowledge	about	local	conditions	not	accessible	
to	the	government	in	Beijing.	The	lack	of	local	involvement	has	al-
ready	led	to	considerable	delays	in	carrying	out	various	reforms	
from	the	third	plenum’s	agenda.	The	argument	about	obstruction	
from	local	vested	 interests,	which	 is	often	raised	 in	China,	may	
well	be	 true	but	 the	alleged	obstruction	 is	difficult	 to	 trace	and	
assess,	and	its	significance	should	be	declining	as	the	anti-corrup-
tion	campaign	progresses.	In	expert	debates,	the	incoherence	of	
the	new	system	of	incentives	for	officials	involved	in	the	reforms	
is	often	identified	as	one	of	the	more	important	causes	of	the	re-
forms’	stagnation.	Another	factor	contributing	to	local	resistance	
concerns	 the	 unstable	 financial	 situation	 of	 local	 governments	
and	the	absence	of	adequate	compensation	for	the	fiscal	burdens	
that	come	with	the	reforms.
The	development	of	a	new	architecture	for	the	implementation	of	
reforms	 after	 the	 third	plenum	was	 accompanied	by	 important	
changes	in	the	system	of	evaluation	of	local	bureaucratic	cadres,	
which	was	intended	to	tie	promotions	more	closely	with	commit-
ment	to	a	more	sustainable	growth	model	and	implementation	of	
the	reforms	initiated	by	the	national	government.	As	the	Chinese	
authorities	announced	China’s	entry	into	a	new	phase	of	develop-
ment,	in	which	the	country’s	economy	was	expected	to	grow	more	
slowly	but	more	sustainably,	that	meant	that	the	performance	of	
local	administrations	would	no	longer	be	measured	using	hard	in-
dices	based	mainly	local	GDP	growth.	China	is	now	supposed	to	
plan	its	actions	taking	into	consideration	other,	less	measurable	
objectives	such	as	improvement	of	the	quality	of	public	services	or	
environmental	protection.	At	the	same	time	the	local	administra-
tions	are	encouraged,	through	the	pro-government	press	promot-
ing	the	‘spirit	of	the	third	plenum’	and	frequent	field	visits	by	of-
ficials	from	Beijing,	to	put	forward	innovative	reform	initiatives,	
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which	will	then	be	evaluated	via	leading	groups	for	the	deepening	
of	reforms.	This	puts	the	local	bureaucratic	cadres	in	a	situation	
where	they	have	no	clarity	about	the	desirable	effects	or	Beijing’s	
ultimate	expectations,	as	a	result	of	which	many	adopt	a	passive,	
wait-and-see	attitude.60	Meanwhile	the	stepped	up	pressure	relat-
ed	to	the	anti-corruption	campaign,	and	the	real	threat	of	demo-
tion	within	the	party	faced	by	low-performing	officials,	discour-
ages	the	bureaucrats	from	taking	any	radical	reform	initiatives.	
Successfully	boosting	local	GDP	has	been	a	way	for	local	officials	
to	secure	promotions,	but	it	has	also	been	fundamentally	impor-
tant	for	local	governments	because	of	the	tax	revenues	needed	to	
finance	basic	public	services.	One	of	the	outcomes	of	the	reforms	
carried	out	in	the	1990s	was	to	transfer	a	large	proportion	of	tax	
revenues	to	the	central	budget,	which	considerably	undermined	
the	financial	position	of	 local	governments.61	They	started	to	 in-
creasingly	rely	on	selling	 land	use	 rights	 (land	 is	owned	by	 the	
state	in	China),	and	transfers	from	the	central	budget.62	The	gap	
between	 local	 revenues	 and	 spending	 needs	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	
sources	of	China’s	 economic	problems	–	 it	 incentivises	 the	 local	
governments	to	stimulate	the	real	estate	markets	(to	ensure	reve-
nues	from	land	rights	sale),	take	on	more	debt	or	encourage	invest-
ments	by	SOEs.	Until alternative sources of budget revenues 
are provided, the local governments will remain determined 
to stimulate the economy in an unsustainable way. That	means	
in	turn,	that	adequately	synchronising	and	prioritising	reforms	is	
a	crucial	task	–	and	given	the	defects	of	the	reform	architecture	
adopted	by	Beijing,	also	a	crucial	risk	–	in	resolving	the	Gordian	
60	 Anna	L.	Ahlers	i	Matthias	Stepan,	op. cit.
61	 The	 share	 of	 local	 governments	 in	 total	 budget	 revenue	 decreased	 from	
around	70-80%	to	45-50%,	while	 their	share	 in	total	spending	remained	
at	around	65-75%.	See:	Yinqu	Lu	and	Tao	Sun,	Local	Government	Financ-
ing	Platforms	in	China:	A	Fortune	or	Misfortune?,	IMF Working Paper, 2013,	
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13243.pdf	
62	 Depending	on	the	province,	the	share	of	land	rights	sales	in	total	revenues	
ranged	from	30%	to	50%	in	2009,	ibidem.
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knot	of	 local	finance.	Until	 the	 tax	reform	is	completed	and	 the	
volume	of	 transfers	 from	the	central	budget	 increases,	 the	 local	
bureaucratic	elites	will	not	back	the	provisional	attempts	at	com-
batting	local	problems,	such	as	stopping	the	shadow	banking	sec-
tor	from	financing	public	spending,	cooling	down	the	real	estate	
market	or	reducing	the	production	capacity	of	local	industry,63	as	
they	 face	 the	 threat	 of	 running	budget	deficits	 and	 seeing	 local	
businesses	go	bankrupt	and	unemployment	increase.	Moreover,	
the	new	competences	transferred	to	the	 local	governments	may	
also	end	up	being	used	to	stimulate	the	local	economies,	as	illus-
trated	by	the	decentralisation	of	the	construction	permit	proce-
dure	for	new	coal	power	plants,	 following	which	the	number	of	
new	boilers	under	construction	increased	dramatically.
3. The Xi factor: personalised economic policy
The party secretary general Xi Jinping has used the deci-
sion-making structure based on leading groups to gain per-
sonal control of the reforms. The concentration of power in 
his hands should be seen as one of the main objectives of the 
changes implemented, and not as an unintended side effect. 
So	much	is	evident	from	the	way	Xi	has	been	gradually	concen-
trating	 many	 capacities	 relevant	 to	 reform	 governance	 in	 his	
hands.	He	currently	heads	the	Leading	Group	for	the	Deepening	
of	Reforms	as	well	as	several	other	key	groups	including	the	Lead-
ing	Group	for	Financial	and	Economic	Affairs,	which	has	been	in	
place	since	the	start	of	the	‘reform	and	opening-up’	period.	His	po-
sition	gives	him	extensive	control	of	the	functioning	of	the	lead-
ing	groups,	providing	both	insight	into	each	of	the	reforms	on	the	
agenda	and	the	tools	to	potentially	initiate	a	change	of	direction	
or	stop	work	on	a	given	reform.	Thus,	Xi	Jinping	has	become	the	
63	 As	there	are	considerable	differences	between	China’s	provinces,	this	situ-
ation	affects	the	deeply	indebted	regions	that	rely	on	‘old’	industries	(such	
as	Shanxi	or	Liaoning)	to	a	much	greater	extent	than	the	rich	provinces	like	
Guangdong	or	Shanghai.
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central	figure	in	the	economic	reform	process,	making	its	success	
partly	dependent	on	the	personal	factor.
The	side-lining	of	the	collective	leadership	principle	and	the	con-
centration	of	power	in	Xi’s	hands	makes	the	dynamics	of	reforms	
partly	dependent	on	his	personal	attitude	 towards	economic	 is-
sues.	The	amount	of	time	and	attention	that	Xi	can	devote	to	the	
economic	 reform	 matters	 is	 limited	 by	 his	 unprecedented	 in-
volvement	 in	 foreign	policy	 issues,	his	efforts	 to	strictly	control	
the	army	and	the	internal	struggles	within	the	CPC.	The	Chinese	
leader’s	biographers	also	point	to	the	fact	that	he	has	relatively	lit-
tle	experience	in	economic	governance,	with	which	he	has	dealt	
only	 while	 serving	 as	 the	 governor	 of	 the	 Zhejiang	 and	 Fujian	
provinces.	Unlike	prime	minister	Li,	Xi	has	no	degree	in	econom-
ics,	which	may	lead	to	a	relative	marginalisation	of	the	reforms	
question.	 It	 also	means	 a	 bigger	 role	 for	 his	 economic	 advisors,	
especially	Liu	He,	who	is	 the	chief	of	general	office	of	 the	Lead-
ing	Group	for	Financial	and	Economic	Affairs	and	reportedly	the	
main	architect	of	the	third	plenum’s	agenda	and	the	author	of	the	
top-level	 design	 concept.	 However,	 Xi’s	 advisers	 hold	 relatively	
weak	positions	in	the	party	(Liu	He	is	not	a	member	of	the	Polit-
buro),	which	may	slow	down	the	reforms	in	the	situation	where	
Xi’s	attention	is	focused	on	other	priorities.
The	concentration	of	power	in	Xi	Jinping’s	hands	also	makes	his	
personal	ideological	orientation	a	factor	in	the	discussion	of	the	
reforms’	chances	of	success.	On	the	one	hand,	Xi	has	expressed	
support	for	market	reforms	since	the	beginning	of	his	term	and	
has	been	very	clear	in	referring	to	the	reform	legacy	of	Deng	Xi-
aoping	(his	first	official	trip	was	to	the	province	of	Guangdong	and	
the	city	of	Shenzhen,	the	destination	of	Deng’s	famous	‘southern	
tour’64).	On	the	other	hand,	however,	he	has	constantly	underlined	
64	 The	‘southern	tour’	refers	to	Deng	Xiaoping’s	visit	to	the	southern	province	
of	Guangdong,	regarded	as	the	stronghold	of	market	reforms,	and	Shenzhen,	
the	city	hosting	China’s	first	special	economic	zone.	The	aim	of	the	symbolic	
trip	was	to	overcome	resistance	against	change	within	the	conservative	left-
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the	leading	role	of	CPC	in	China’s	development,	as	evidenced	by	
his	numerous	speeches	and	the	official	documents.65	It should be 
concluded that from the point of view of Xi Jinping and the 
more broadly understood party leadership, the principal ob-
jective of reforms is invariably to consolidate the party’s pow-
er and strengthen its social legitimacy by ensuring a steady 
improvement in living standards across China.66	This	means	
the	Chinese	leaders	will	be	cautious	in	implementing	reforms	that	
involve	a	risk	of	political	instability,	and	such	risk	increases	as	the	
economic	 situation	 in	China	deteriorates.	According	 to	 experts,	
such	a	position	is	expressed	in	fragments	of	speeches	made	by	Xi,	
who	spoke	on	various	occasions	about	the	need	to	‘carefully	pre-
pare	reforms’,	‘avoid	making	mistakes	that	cannot	be	rectified	or	
reversed’,	 and	 ‘eliminate	extreme	solutions’.67	 In this interpre-
tation, the Leading Group for the Deepening of Reforms may 
serve Xi as an instrument of total and ‘double-sided’ control 
of the reforms, allowing him to overcome resistance to re-
forms but also to block overly ambitious moves.	That	 is	 im-
portant	because	apart	 from	the	groups	defending	 the	 status quo	
there	are	also	groups	within	the	party	which	advocate	more	radi-
cal	liberalisation	and	which	therefore	may	be	seen	as	a	threat	to	
economic	stability	and	to	the	leading	role	of	the	CPC	itself.68	
wing	of	the	CPC,	which	was	criticising	Deng’s	reforms	after	the	Tiananmen	
Square	events	in	1989.	The	effects	of	the	visit	included	a	considerable	speed-
ing	up	of	reforms	which	led	to	the	deep	restructuring	of	state-owned	enter-
prises	in	the	years	1995-1997,	among	other	outcomes.	
65	 As	well	as	the	campaigns	Xi	has	launched	to	promote	ideological	purity,	his	
efforts	to	limit	pluralism,	and	most	importantly,	the	absence	of	any	meaning-
ful	progress	of	the	political	reform.
66	 Teresa	Wright,	Party	and	state	in	post-Mao	China,	Polity	Press,	Cambridge	
2015,	p.	1-17.
67	 Why	 Xi's	 APEC	 Summit	 Remarks	 Are	 Being	 Misinterpreted,	 Caix-
in,	 16.10.2013,	 http://english.caixin.com/2013-10-16/100592595.
html?sourceEntityId=100594992
68	 One	of	the	proposed	ways	to	resolve	the	imbalances	in	the	Chinese	economic	
system	is	to	launch	painful	adjustment	processes,	allow	a	larger	number	of	
bankruptcies	to	take	place	and	‘cleanse’	the	economy	using	market	forces.	
Other	pro-reform	groups	argue	 that	 further	growth	should	be	based	on	
a	 change	of	 the	business	 environment,	 the	development	of	 independent	
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The	concentration	of	power	in	the	hands	of	the	secretary	general	
of	the	Communist	Party	of	China	(who	is	at	the	same	time	presi-
dent)	is	a	departure from the unwritten rule, observed since 
the 1980s, that oversight of economic reforms should be a com-
petence vested in the prime minister who heads the state 
administration and the key institutions responsible for the 
implementation of reforms.	While	prime	minister	Li	Keqiang	
is	the	deputy	head	of	most	of	the	major	leading	groups,	questions	
over	the	relation	between	Xi	and	Li	and	the	division	of	decision-
making	competences	between	them	remain	unclear.	Since	2014,	
Li	Keqiang	has	been	much	less	conspicuous	in	the	media	and	some	
observers	have	noted	the	delays	in	the	prime	minister’s	flagship	
project,	 the	Shanghai	 free	 trade	 zone,	 viewing	 this	 as	 evidence	
of	his	political	marginalisation.	One	of	the	most	frequently	men-
tioned	reasons	for	this,	apart	from	a	conflict	over	economic	com-
petences,	concerns	a	potential	inter-faction	fight	within	the	CPC	
–	as	Li	Keqiang	originates	from	the	Communist	Youth	League	and	
is	regarded	as	a	protégé	of	the	previous	president	Hu	Jintao.69	Be-
cause	of	the	opaqueness	of	the	Chinese	political	system,	experts	
formulating	 opinions	 on	 the	 Xi-Li	 duo’s	 general	 outlook	 on	 the	
desirable	direction	of	reforms	need	to	rely	on	interpretations	of	
official	statements	and	often	come	to	contradictory	conclusions:	
while	some	view	the	 ‘left-wing’	and	party-focused	Xi	 Jinping	as	
the	 one	 blocking	 reforms,	 others	 believe	 that	 resistance	 to	 re-
forms	comes	from	the	stimulus	advocate	Li	Keqiang.70	If	there	is	
indeed	a	 fundamental	 conflict	over	 the	division	of	 competences	
between	the	two	key	centres	of	power,	and	potentially	also	an	ide-
ological	conflict,	that	should	be	regarded	as	a	major	hindrance	for	
regulatory	institutions,	and,	most	importantly,	rule	of	law	and	independent	
courts.	
69	 Why	Xi	 Jinping	has	no	need	of	 factions	 in	 the	Communist	Party,	 SCMP,	
8.08.2016,	http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/1999155/why-
xi-jinping-has-no-need-factions-communist-party	
70	 See:	Willy	Wo-Lap	Lam,	op. cit.,	p.	159;	Barry	Naughton,	Two	Trains	Running:	
Supply-Side	Reform,	SOE	Reform	and	 the	Authoritative	Personage,	China 
Leadership Monitor,	No.	50,	Hoover	Institute	2016,	http://www.hoover.org/
sites/default/files/research/docs/clm50bn.pdf	
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reforms	that	can	be	removed	only	after	the	‘new	opening’	in	the	
aftermath	of	the	CPC	congress	in	2017.	
4. Economic slowdown and instability
During	the	three	years	that	have	passed	since	the	announcement	
of	the	new	reform	agenda	at	the	CPC	Central	Committee	third	ple-
num,	the	Chinese	leadership	has	had	to	operate	in	an	unusually	
tumultuous	 and	 unstable	 economic	 environment	 that	 is	 with-
out	precedent	 in	 the	entire	 ‘reform	and	opening-up’	period.	The	
steady	slowing	down	of	GDP	growth,	which	has	morphed	into	re-
cession	 in	some	provinces,	has	been	accompanied	by	a	 series	of	
speculative	bubbles	in	the	financial	markets,	two	serious	break-
downs	 in	 the	stock	exchanges	 in	 July	2015	and	 January	2016,	as	
well	as	a	significant	outflow	of	capital	abroad.	China’s entry into 
a period of economic slowdown and deep economic instabil-
ity has prompted the party’s top leadership to change its view 
about the most desired speed and scope of reforms and adopt 
much more cautious positions than in 2013, when the third 
plenum’s agenda was initially announced. The	party	 leaders	
also	 sometimes	 resort	 to	 tested	 tools	 of	 economic	 intervention.	
Meanwhile,	a	heated	debate	is	going	on	within	the	top	ranks	of	the	
CPC	and	among	economic	experts	about	what	kind	of	economic	
policy	would	be	most	adequate	in	the	current	conditions	of	slower	
growth	and	stagnating	reforms.
The	CPC	 leadership	may	be	 deliberately	 delaying	 any	measures	
which	involve	the	risk	of	uncontrollable	economic	developments	
such	as	a	sudden	slowing	down	of	 the	GDP	growth	rate,	drastic	
breakdowns	in	the	financial	markets	or	a	sudden	increase	in	un-
employment.	Deepening	certain	market	reforms	would	be	equiv-
alent	to	giving	up	important	tools	of	economic	governance,	which	
the	Chinese	leadership	may	use	to	buttress	economic	stability	if	
needed.	 In recent years, when the Chinese leadership faced 
major threats, it often opted for deep ad hoc intervention us-
ing tried and tested tools, which in many instances meant 
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taking a step backwards from the pro-market agenda of the 
third plenum. The	involvement	of	state	financial	institutions	in	
interventions	to	save	the	stock	exchange	in	2015	may	serve	as	an	
example	here,	as	it	resulted	in	a	massive	de facto	nationalisation	of	
the	companies	listed	in	Chinese	stock	markets	and	the	introduc-
tion	of	strict	regulations	in	the	financial	markets.71	
The	prime	example	of	 this	cautious	approach	on	 the	part	of	 the	
Chinese	 leadership	concerns	the	supply-side	reform,	which	was	
made	a	priority	in	2016.	Unlike the reforms that were included 
in the original third plenum agenda, it is not about resolving 
China’s most urgent economic problems of debt, overproduc-
tion and inefficiency through a broad, structural reconstruc-
tion of the market environment which would then enforce 
adjustment processes by exposing companies to heightened 
competition. Instead, it relies on administrative instru-
ments to administer some ‘bloodletting’ to the Chinese econ-
omy in a controlled manner. The	 reliance	 on	 political	means	
may	be	a	reaction	to	a	genuine	stagnation	of	the	key	pro-market	
reforms,	which	makes	it	necessary	for	the	reformers	to	focus	all	
their	political	clout	on	one	project,	but	it	also	means	a	return	to	
the	 long-used,	 relatively	 safe	methods	 of	 economic	 governance.	
As	on	many	occasions	in	the	past,	the	quotas	for	the	reduction	of	
redundant	production	capacity	are	set	by	the	NDRC	for	specific	in-
dustries	and	provinces,	and	implementation	in	the	regions	is	then	
enforced	using	political	channels.	The	administrative	mechanism	
is	used	to	attain	other	objectives	of	the	reform,	such	as	alleviation	
of	debt,	which	is	done	using	state	financial	institutions	specially	
established	for	that	purpose	and	tasked	with	collecting	and	writ-
ing	down	bad	debts,	as	was	the	case	in	the	1990s.
71	 Another	example	concerned	the	imposition	of	additional	restrictions	on	the	
convertibility	of	the	renminbi	in	reaction	to	the	massive	outflow	of	capital	
in	2016	–	a	move	which	ran	counter	to	the	policy	of	opening	China’s	capital	
account.	
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Given the prospect of a further slackening of GDP growth in 
China, the biggest question is the one concerning the Chinese 
leadership’s attitude towards using the established economic 
stimulus instruments.	This	question	is	one	of	the	most	signifi-
cant	points	in	the	dispute	within	the	CPC	top	leadership,	as	illus-
trated	by	the	situation	triggered	by	the	publication,	in	May	2016,	
of	an	extensive	commentary	about	the	role	of	stimulus	in	imple-
menting	 the	supply-side	reform	on	page	 two	of	 the	government	
newspaper,	Renmin Ribao.	The	commentary	was	published	in	the	
form	 of	 an	 interview	 with	 an	 unnamed	 ‘authoritative	 person’	
(quanwei renshi)72	and	was	a	reaction	to	the	economic	policy	devel-
opments	in	the	preceding	months	when	the	Chinese	authorities,	
expecting	the	new	reform	to	have	a	negative	impact	on	economic	
growth,	 decided	 to	 implement	 additional	 stimulus	measures	 in	
late	2015	and	2016.	Among	other	measures,	monetary	policy	was	
eased,	new	infrastructural	projects	were	launched	and	SOEs	con-
siderably	 increased	 investments,	 reinvigorating	 the	 growth	 of	
commodity	prices	and	heavy	industry.	In	the	interview,	the	‘au-
thoritative	 person’	 expressed	 damning	 criticism	 of	 such	 policy,	
describing	 the	 potentially	 ‘lethal’	 threats	 coming	 from	 the	 pil-
ing	up	of	debt	(risks	for	the	financial	markets,	recession,	 loss	of	
savings	by	the	public)	and	arguing	that	short-term	stimulus	was	
based	 on	 ‘fantasies’	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 quickly	 restoring	
rapid	GDP	growth	while,	in	reality,	the	growth	rate	should	be	ex-
pected	to	enter	a	downward	trend.	In	that	situation,	the	priority	
should	be	to	gradually	reduce	the	debt	pile,	reduce	overcapacity,	
etc.	The	text	named	neither	the	author	nor	the	direct	addressee	of	
the	criticism,	but	there	is	consensus	among	experts	that	the	top	
leadership	of	the	CPC	had	been	involved	in	its	publication.73	The	
72	 开局首季问大势,	Renmin Ribao,	09.05.2016,	http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/
html/2016-05/09/nw.D110000renmrb_20160509_1-02.htm	
73	 The	most	common	interpretation	is	that	the	‘authoritative	person’	is	Liu	He,	
Xi	Jinping’s	chief	economic	advisor,	head	of	the	Leading	Group	for	Finance	
and	the	Economy	and	the	main	author	of	the	supply-side reform	concept.	The	
main	addressee	would	then	be	prime	minister	Li	Keqiang	who,	on	the	ac-
count	of	his	position,	is	Liu	He’s	main	political	adversary	in	the	battle	for	
control	of	China’s	economic	policy.	See:	Barry	Naughton,	op. cit.	
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incident	should	be	seen	as	proof	that	there	is	indeed	a	split	within	
the	top	ranks	of	China’s	leadership	between	a	group	arguing	that	
the	country	needs	to	‘tighten	its	belt’	now,	and	a	group	which	be-
lieves	that	stimulus	is	the	way	to	get	through	the	difficult	times.	
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v. outlook for thE futurE
The	pro-market	agenda	put	forward	at	the	third	plenum	in	2013	to	
redefine	the	role	of	the	state	in	China’s	economy	has	stumbled	on	
a	number	of	obstacles	during	Xi	Jinping’s	first	term,	as	a	result	of	
which	the	crucial	reforms	have	been	stagnating.	The	factors	which	
contributed	 to	 this	 included	defects	 in	 the	new	reform	architec-
ture,	 resistance	 from	 sections	 of	 the	 bureaucracy	 interested	 in	
preserving	the	status quo,	as	well	as	the	economic	problems	which	
prompted	the	party’s	top	leadership	to	act	inconsistently.	Because	
some	of	those	problems	are	political	in	nature,	the	19th	congress	of	
the	CPC,	which	takes	place	in	the	autumn	of	2017,	may	potentially	
be	the	single	most	important	event	for	the	continuation	of	reforms.	
In	keeping	with	the	informal	rules	on	key	nominations	observed	
within	the	CPC,	a	‘new	opening’	is	to	be	expected	within	the	top	
ranks	of	the	party	leadership	–	at	least	11	of	the	25	members	of	the	
Politburo	will	be	replaced,	including	5	out	of	the	7	members	of	the	
Standing	Committee	(the	party’s	most	important	body).74	The	po-
litical	decisions	taken	at	the	congress	will	translate	in	early	2018,	
after	the	inauguration	of	the	13th	term	of	the	National	People’s	Con-
gress,	into	reshuffles	within	the	state	administration.
There	are	many	indications	that	the	coming	CPC	congress	will	ena-
ble	Xi	Jinping	to	use	his	political	position,	which	has	been	strength-
ened	considerably	in	recent	years,	to	place	his	people	in	the	most	
important	party	bodies	 and	 central	 state	 administration	 institu-
tions.75	That	would	lead	to	people	associated	with	Xi’s	circle	being	
appointed	to	key	posts,	which	would	facilitate	building	consensus	
between	 the	most	 important	 centres	of	power	and	might	 resolve	
some	of	 the	conflicts	over	division	of	 responsibilites,	which	have	
been	paralysing	the	current	reform	architecture.	Also	 important	
74	 Those	numbers	may	change	–	because	the	rules	for	selecting	new	members	
are	not	formalised,	the	secretary	general	may	adjust	the	specific	numbers.
75	 In	an	extreme	scenario,	Xi	could	even	decide	to	replace	Li	Keqiang	and	ap-
point	a	new	prime	minister.
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will	be	the	steps	that	may	be	taken	to	refine	the	tools	for	disciplin-
ing	the	administration	and	consolidating	the	new	system	of	incen-
tives	for	local	officials,	in	order	to	get	them	involved	in	the	reform	
process.	 In	 the	 new	 political	 arrangement,	market	 reforms	may	
be	resumed	–	as	the	vision	of	reforms	laid	down	in	the	documents	
of	the	third	plenum	remains	valid	and	largely	addresses	the	long-
term	challenges	facing	the	Chinese	economy.	
Nevertheless,	the	scale	of	challenges	remains	huge,	and	the	con-
tinued	 use	 of	 stimulus	measures	 in	 recent	 years	 has	made	 the	
situation	of	the	Chinese	economy	even	more	complicated.	In or-
der to fix the foundations of the economy by resuming the 
agenda of the third plenum, the CPC leaders will have to 
commit considerable organisational and political resources, 
which they consequently will not be able to use in other ar-
eas of state governance. The fate of reforms will thus depend 
on the individual calculations of Xi Jinping and his circle, 
who will have to weigh the long-term benefits for the state 
and party that returning to path of stable growth could of-
fer against the short-term benefits that can be gained by re-
solving ad hoc problems.	 In	 that	 sense,	 the	 success	of	 reforms	
will	depend	primarily	on	the	dynamics	of	China’s	GDP	growth,	as	
well	as	the	minimum	growth	threshold	below	which	the	Chinese	
leadership	would	opt	for	stimulus	again.	The	reforms	are	likely	to	
be	affected	by	unpredictable	economic	phenomena,	such	as	sud-
den	breakdowns	in	the	shaky	financial	markets	or	shocks	in	the	
global	economy,	i.e.	the	kind	of	events	which	the	Chinese	leader-
ship	to	date	typically	strove	to	resolve	at	the	expense	of	its	reform	
agenda.	Preserving	growth	‘at	any	cost’	could	be	one	of	the	tools	
to	ease	the	internal	social	tensions.	Finally,	unpredicted	external	
developments	may	also	be	an	important	factor,	such	as	a	rise	in	
international	political	tensions,	which	might	prompt	the	Chinese	
leadership	to	continue	the	unsustainable	stimulus	policy	in	order	
to	be	able	to	maintain	room	for	manoeuvre	in	foreign	policy.
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